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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There are many factors contributing to a firm’s success, board powers and composition, 
organizational structure and procedures. These factors, however, are still less important 
than the sufficiency of the firm’s business model or the qualities of its top executives. 
Hence, we do not have to wonder why shareholders, consultants and politicians as well as 
scholars did not pay so much attention to such common corporate governance issues.  
 
In past decades, the interest in corporate governance, especially in the board of directors, 
rose sharply. One of the reasons was the increase in US takeover activity in the 1980s and 
emerging globalization. Some consequences of emerging globalization are shorter product 
life cycles, decreasing profit margins and the intense competition we are promoting, which 
altogether lead to an increasing anxiety about the competitiveness of countries’ institutions. 
The takeover activity lead to conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders, 
while the increasing competition did not leave room for neglecting any factors that could 
go a long way towards firm performance. Furthermore, increasing competition lead to pay 
more attention to differences in corporate governance, its global expansion and question 
the vast number of boards today, although most organizations are required to be governed 
by a board of directors. 
One of the first economists who addresses boards of directors is Adam Smith (1776) with 
the following interesting statement: 
“The directors of [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should 
watch over the same anxious vigilance [as owners].... Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more of less, in the management of the affairs of 
such a company” (p. 700). 
Berle and Means (1932), figured out a similar point of view pointing out the agency 
problems in an organization as well as Smith: 
“Control will tend to be in the hands of those who select the proxy committee and 
by whom, the election of directors for ensuing period will be made. Since the proxy 
committee is appointed by the existing management, the latter can virtually dictate 
their own successors” (p. 87). 
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Both studies point out the agency problem in an organisation or more specifically, the 
agency problem between owners, shareholders and management. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003) consider that shareholders “are generally seen as unable to control management 
directly”, and management, however “tend to be insufficiently vigilant or trustworthy 
when it comes to other people’s property” (p. 10).  
Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004) find that “managerial costs have been higher in 
social democracies than elsewhere […]” (p. 138). This finding linked together with the US 
takeover activities in the 1980s and the emerging globalization, make it is safe to assume 
that at that time, the agency problem was intensified in the ‘Anglo-Saxon system’, 
representing the US corporate governance system, and then spread likewise on emerging 
markets.  
Gugler et al. (2004, p. 149) show that the ‘Anglo-Saxon systems’ are the one which “are 
better at protecting shareholders than other systems and that they lead to superior 
macroeconomic performance” – this is why many countries try to adopt this governance 
system partially or entirely. In emerging markets, where family ownership and business 
groups are part and parcel of the ownership structure in the corporate governance, agency 
problems occur and have to be reduced too. Gutierrez and Pombo (2007) find that the 
agency problem occurs because most firms are owned by large shareholders who in most 
cases belong to business groups too. 
However, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) present some solutions to the agency problem, 
though difficult to apply. One solution may be to provide management with strong 
incentives contractually. However, “In most large corporations, the shareholders are too 
diffuse, rationally plagued by a free-rider problem, and, for the same reason, too 
uninformed to set managers’ compensations” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003, p. 10). 
Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) think that this problem, as well as the 
underlying direct control, could be eased in situations “in which a large outside 
shareholder has sufficient incentive herself to tackle them” (p. 10).  
 
As you might see, board of directors are an important topic of research in many areas, not 
just in economics, but there is still more research to be done. In my diploma thesis I am 
going to investigate the ‘Board of directors in emerging markets’.  
The first part consist of general research on board of directors. There, I investigate the 
reason for the existence and structure of boards. In the latter, I present the three categories 
of directors such as the insiders, outsiders and the institutional portfolio holders. 
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Afterwards, I am going to face the effects of the boards’ corporate performance with each 
board size and composition. The CEO turnover as well as takeovers and the executive 
compensation will be explained too. After presenting you the controversial board reforms 
with its global impact on corporations and the global adaptation of the Anglo-Saxon 
governance system, I am going to focus on emerging markets, the second part. 
Brazil is going to be my choice of representing an emerging market because of its size and 
interesting corporate governance system. At first, however, I am going to show some 
characteristics of emerging markets, though limited on Latin America. Additionally, I am 
going to present the corporate governance in emerging markets, and then in Brazil, to 
establish a connection to further findings of my research which are based on Brazil. 
Furthermore, I have done some research on the corporate ownership and control. There I 
am taking account of the direct as well as indirect structure of ownership and control. 
Afterwards, I am going to illustrate relevant evidence of the consequences that a separation 
of ownership and control are facing. The board of directors in emerging markets, though 
specified on the Brazilian market, will complete my research and indicate some interesting 
findings regarding the board and ownership structure as well as the necessity of control and 
board of directors in Brazil. 
The last section summarizes the major findings, concludes the diploma thesis and shows 
why boards of directors are such a controversial topic, where still a lot of research has to be 
done, especially in emerging markets.  
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1 WHY ARE THERE BOARD OF DIRECTORS? 
 
 
On the one hand, board of directors are rumoured to be insufficient guardians of 
shareholders’ money and too much in management’s hand (cf. Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). On 
the other hand, boards exist for a long time and if they were really so inefficient, we can 
proceed on the assumption that the market would improve or even replace them.  
To put it in other words, an institution which is not considered to be ‘first-best’ efficient, 
does not mean that the market need another regulatory solution. Hermalin and Katz (1993), 
for example, think that board of directors are a ‘second-best’ solution for companies being 
confronted with the agency problem between the members’ different interests. 
Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), however, suggest that “a board of directors 
is the equilibrium solution (albeit possible second best) to some agency problems 
confronting the firm” (p. 9).  
 
However, what agency problems are they referring to and why does a direct control 
problem arise? First of all, the agency problem exists between a company’s owners, 
shareholders and management. Shareholders are always seen as being unable to control 
management and the management is seen as being insufficient to others people’s money. In 
this love triangle, it is possible to keep the agency problem at bay by corporations, that 
should provide the management with strong incentives contractually. Furthermore, “this 
problem, as well as the direct control problem, could be alleviated in situations in which a 
large outside shareholder has sufficient incentive herself to tackle them” (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003, p.10). 
 
Therefore, we can not assume that board of directors are the product of regulation, and, if 
so, boards “would represent deadweight costs to firms which subsequent lobbying would 
have eliminated, at least somewhere in the world” (Braendle & Noll, 2004, p.10). So, we 
can expect boards to have minimum size because of resembling deadweight costs. In fact, 
boards are much bigger than required by law. Hence, the literature defines boards of 
directors as being a market solution to the contracting problems companies are facing. 
Some reasons of these contracting problems are the diffuse shareholders, the free-riding 
problem and the often too uninformed shareholders to be able to control managers.  
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Given their power and importance of boards of directors across boundaries in different 
organizational forms, boards have to meet a multitude of requirements. First of all, boards 
do have to have a specific number of members with at least some specified regularity. 
Then, boards may need to have various committees and finally, some directors have to 
have some nominal independence from management. 
 
To put it shortly in another way, boards of directors emerged because shareholders did not 
trust the managers with their money and could control them.  
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2 HOW ARE BOARD OF DIRECTORS STRUCUTRED? 
 
 
In general, boards of directors are made up of insiders and outsider. However, Gugler, 
Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004) found a third important category of owners in the USA; the 
institutional holders.  
Now, we can classify different owners into those three categories. At first, we have the 
company’s managers, who are insiders. Then we have the outsiders, who can be classified 
into families, institutional holders such as pensions and funds, and “affiliated” or “gray” 
directors. Furthermore, independent directors are classed among outside directors too. 
Finally, other financial institutions such as banks, and non-financial institutions such as 
other firms belong to the third category, the institutional portfolio holders.  
 
Independently, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) indicate that without knowing the whole 
theory of why there are boards of directors, it is still possible to study their structure and 
tasks. So, the first modelling approach of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) is to see ”the 
board as a “principal” to management’s “agent” in a classic principal-agent framework” 
(p.10). This principal agent modelling, however, does not provide any detailed information 
about board-specific phenomena such as the ratio of insiders to outsiders and the influence, 
that management has towards the selection of directors. This model, more precisely, the 
Hermalin-Weisbach model, derives about eight predictions about the dynamics of the CEO 
and board’s relationship. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003, p.11) outlined their predictions as 
follows: 
1. A CEO who performs poorly is more likely to be replaced than one who 
performs well. 
2. CEO turnover is more sensitive to performance when the board is more 
independent. 
3. The Probability of independent directors being added to the board rises 
following poor firm performance. 
4. Board independence declines over the course of a CEO’s tenure. 
5. Accounting measures of performance are better predictors of management 
turnover than stock price performance. 
6. There should be long-term persistence in corporate governance. 
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7. The stock price reaction to management changes should be negative if the CEO 
is fired based on private information, but positive if the manager is fired on the 
basis of public information. 
8. A CEO’s salary should be insensitive to past performance at relatively low 
levels of past performance, but sensitive at relatively high levels of past 
performance.  
 
Those three dominant categories of shareholders – the inside owners, the outside 
individuals as blockholders and the institutional portfolio holders – are going to be 
explained in more detail.  
 
 
2.1  INSIDERS 
 
Managers, employees or former employees of the firm are considered to be insiders. They 
are not independent to the CEO, because the success of the insiders’ careers depends on the 
CEO’s success. Due to this, there is no chance that there is going to be a conflict between 
the manager and the owner of the firm and so, they both can pursue their businesses. Since 
the existence of a separation of ownership and control, which was evaluated by Berle and 
Means (1932), a number of new studies examined the enormous economic consequences 
of the conflict between managers and owners. Additionally, an “Anglo-Saxon” corporate-
governance system was assumed, which I am going to explain in section 6.2 in more detail. 
 
Nonetheless, outside directors are shareholders. Hence, they have an incentive to control 
the company’s actions. There is an assumption that when managers do not hold large 
amounts of their companies’ stakes, they do not have the same financial interest as their 
shareholders. However, if they would hold a large amount of shares from their own 
company, they would have an interest in maximizing the shareholder’s profit. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found out, that there are two effects on the incentive to 
maximize shareholder wealth when increasing insiders’ shares. First of all, the market 
value of the firm increases and second, when the shares of management increases, the 
chance of a manager being replaced by a hostile takeover, because management pursues 
their own goals of profit maximization.  
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Furthermore, Gugler et al. (2004) have evidence that the performance of companies 
worsens by managerial entrenchment from the view of shareholders and due to this, shares 
hold by management give an perfect incentive to improve the company’s performance.  
In sub-item 3 you will find more information about corporate performance/action in 
subject to both board composition and size. 
 
 
2.2  OUTSIDERS 
 
Families, institutional holders such as pensions and mutual funds, “gray” directors and 
independent directors do belong to the outside directors. 
 
Braendle and Noll (2004) find that “starting from 1987, in the US institutional investors, 
pension funds in particular, deviated from their prior role as passive investors by 
submitting proxy proposals focusing largely on corporate governance issues and therefore 
the decision when to reorganize a company” (p. 13).  
Various empirical studies document that institutional investors do have an important role 
as being external monitors (cf. Hansen and Hill 1991; McConnell and Servaes 1990). 
These authors indicate that the higher the investment levels of investments by institutional 
portfolio holders are, the more effective is monitoring. So, institutional investors have the 
incentive and motivation to monitor the management’s actions and decisions when holding 
a vast number of the company’s shares. Additionally, even when monitoring is costly, 
institutional investors are able to monitor management effectively and profitably. 
Furthermore, institutional investors are often characterized as “preferring exit in the 
classical dilemma of "exit" and "voice", this situation has changed, and they are nowadays 
often seen as strong monitors who are interested in the processes of the companies and 
voicing their opinion” (Braendle & Noll, 2004, p.13-14). 
 
Outside directors are not employed in the firm where they hold positions of a director and 
are typically CEOs from another company or prominent individuals in other areas. About 
10 percent of directors do not fall into one of these categories except of businesspeople and 
attorneys who have a long-term relationship with the firm. Hence, “These directors are 
usually referred to as “affiliated” or “gray” [!] directors” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003, 
p.22). Another important aspect of outside directors is that they have a monitoring role 
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over the board and a strong incentive to build up a high reputation of the company. 
However, Gugler et al. (2004) find disagreements considering evidence that outside 
shareholders with small stakes are powerless in maximizing the value of their shares. 
Furthermore, they find that outsiders have a small impact on firm actions but no impact on 
firm performance, though. 
Additionally, outside directors are more independent, provide a better monitoring role than 
insiders and are less informed about the firm’s constraints and opportunities. Additionally, 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2007) find, that “[…] as the benefits (costs) of monitoring 
increase, boards will do more (less) monitoring leading to more (less) outsiders” (p. 5). 
 
Independent directors are outside directors without such affiliations as being “former 
company officers or relatives of company officers and persons who have or are likely to 
have business relationships with the company, such as investment bankers and lawyers” 
(Bhagat & Black, 1998, p. 283).  
Companies with a majority of independent board members are more likely to be managed 
in the interest of the shareholders and additionally, Bhagat and Black (1998) found out that 
“greater board independence remains high on the agenda of activist institutional 
investors” (p. 283). Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence that firms with majority 
independent boards achieve better performance than other firms. “Independent directors 
often turn out to be lapdogs rather than watchdogs” (Bhagat & Black, 1998, p.283). 
 
 
2.3  INSTITUTIONAL PORTFOLIO HOLDERS 
 
Institutional portfolio holders are the third category of the ownership structures are meant 
to be highly effective external monitors, especially in the US and UK. To distinguish these 
sorts of institutions from the institutional holders (pensions and mutual funds), which 
belong to the outsiders, Gugler et al. (2004) refer to them as ‘institutional portfolio 
holders’. Other financial institutions (banks) and non-financial institutions (other firms, 
state) belong to the institutional portfolio holders. 
Friedman (1996) find that “Between 1950 and 1994 the fraction of shares held by 
institutional portfolio holders in the United States rose from 10 per cent to over 50 per 
cent”. Hence, “the managers of institutional portfolio obviously possess sufficient voting 
authority to intervene in shareholders’ meetings and affect outcomes” (Gugler et al., 2004, 
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p. 140). Furthermore, the portfolios of the companies are not materially affected by their 
portfolio managers. 
 
Banks belong to the ‘financial institutions’ that are very important in the corporate 
governance in Germany and Japan. In Germany, banks play a monitoring role for the 
companies that they lent to or owned shares. In Japan, however, the keiretsu’s main bank 
will become important when a company of this conglomerate has a problem with 
“intervening with a cash infusion, a plan of restructuring, or engineering a change of 
management” (Gugler et al., 2004, p. 140). 
However, because of the poor overall performance of the banks’ economies over the last 
20 years, observers are sceptical about the roles of banks in Germany and Japan. There are 
three reasons of the banks’ poor performance. First of all, banks may not have a positive 
monitoring role because banks themselves are managed by professionals who have their on 
goals. Second, banks are free to pursue whatever goal they want to and third, Boehmer 
(2001)  states that German banks are not interested in shareholder value. 
 
The state, for example, belongs to the ‘non-financial institution’, where a state-owned 
company is typically assigned to a ministry. The transportation ministry, for example, has a 
monitoring role for the state’s airline. A ministry, however, is monitored by the parliament, 
which is monitored by the citizens. Hence, the citizens can be regarded as the owners of 
the state companies. Now, Gugler et al. (2004, p. 143) find a “triple principle-agent 
problem (citizen selects parliament, parliament monitors ministry, ministry monitors state 
company”. Consequently, if managers of private companies have to act discreetly to 
pursue their goals because of the resulting principal-agent relationship between managers 
and shareholders, then managers of state companies have to be even more discrete about 
their actions. Hence, we can assume a better performance in private-controlled than in 
state-controlled firms, when performance is measured in terms of efficiency or profit rates. 
 
 
2.4  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2007) determine a downward trend in the percentage of insiders 
on the board of directors. However, small companies present the largest decrease. They 
indicate that “Small firms had the highest percentage of insiders on the board in 1990. 
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This number decreased from about 46% in 1990 to about 34% in 2004. For large firms, 
this ratio dropped from about 28% to 24%” (p. 16). 
 
Considering that there are either insiders or outsider in a board of directors, we can 
determine the number of outsiders, when the number of insiders are known. So, taking the 
findings from Linck, Netter and Yang (2007) into account, which were shown above, we 
can say that repugnant to the insiders, outsiders increased from 54% in 1990 to about 66% 
in 2004. The increase of outsiders show that corporations are seeking for an increase of the 
monitoring role over the board and have a strong incentive to build up a high reputation of 
the company. 
 
Institutional portfolio holders are large blockholders and their “fraction of all shares of 
listed companies increased in Germany from 4% in the year 1990 to nearly 13% in 1998” 
(Schmidt & Drukarczyk, 1997, p. 69). Furthermore, Friedman (1996) demonstrates that in 
the US, the amount of shares held by institutional portfolio holders increased from 10 
percent to over 50 percent between the 1950s and 1994. In Japan, about 45% of the listed 
shares are held by institutional portfolio holders (Kanda, 1997) and in the UK, the shares 
increased from 29% in 1963 to 60% in 1994 (Davies, 1997). 
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3 EFFECTS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 
 
 
Before comparing the corporate performance/actions to both board composition and board 
size as a function of CEO turnovers, takeovers, poison pills and executive compensation, I 
am going to explain the so called “out-of-equilibrium phenomenon” and the “equilibrium 
phenomenon” shortly.   
Either equilibrium or out-of equilibrium phenomena can be interpreted in many empirical 
results. Although they are difficult to distinguish in studies, they have an enormous 
different implication for policies. For example, empirical studies demonstrate that board 
size is negatively related to firm profitability. The out-of-equilibrium interpretation says 
that limits on board size should be promoted or even mandated. However, the equilibrium 
interpretation implies that some other factor is causing both board size and board 
profitability so that such regulations are counterproductive and useless.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Heuristic Illustration of the Distinction between Out-of-Equilibrium and 
Equilibrium Explanations for Certain Empirical Results. Source: Hermalin, B. E., 
Weisbach, M. S., 2003, p. 8 
 
 
“Both endogeneity considerations and the equilibrium nature of the results should be 
carefully considered when evaluating any study of boards or any other aspect of corporate 
governance” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003, p.8). 
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3.1  BOARD COMPOSITION AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
 
Now the question arises, if corporate performance will increase with more outside 
directors? There are three methods trying to answer this question. The first method 
examines at the same time correlations between the proportion of outsiders on boards and 
accounting measures of performance. MacAvoy, Cantor, Dana and Peck (1983), Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991), Mehran (1995), Klein (1998), and Bhagat and Black (2000) are of 
the opinion, that there is an insignificant relationship between the ratio of outside directors 
on boards and the measurement of performance. A second approach was presented by 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). They had the idea to reflect the “value added” of 
intangible factors such as governance by using Tobin’s Q as a performance measurement 
tool. However, “there is no noticeable relationship between the proportion of outside 
directors and Q” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003, p. 12). Finally, Bhagat and Black (2000) 
examine the effect of board composition on long-term stock market and accounting 
performance. The findings were predictable; there is no relationship between board 
composition and firm performance/action. 
 
However, there is evidence that there is an increase in board independence on the 
supposition that a company has a poor performance, but there is no empirical relationship 
between board composition and firm performance. This result is not surprising. As 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) stated correctly, “firm performance is a function of so 
many different factors that it is difficult to imagine that the effect of occasional board 
meetings, etc., would be detectable…” (p. 12). 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) tried to explain the interaction of board composition and 
corporate performance from another point of view. They examined the board composition 
with changes of the firm value; more precisely, they compared the stock price reaction of 
the day of announcement that outside directors will be added to the board. “They find that 
on average there is a statistically significant 0.2 percent increase in stock prices in 
response to the announcement of these appointments” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003, p.13). 
Additionally, there is no notable reason to add an insider to the board. In contrast, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) find out seven years later, that adding an insider to the board, 
somehow increases the stock price. As you see, it is really difficult to distinguish and 
interpret results from the empirical literature. 
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Due to this reason, as might be reasonably expected, there are big differences from the 
results of the equilibrium and non-equilibrium point of view too. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003) summed the findings up as follows: 
“If the equilibrium interpretation is correct, it is hard to explain how certain 
actions could consistently increase firm value. In contrast, if one believes the out-
of-equilibrium interpretation, one must first address the issue of how the firms 
arrived at this out-of-equilibrium situation” (p. 13). 
 
 
3.2  BOARD SIZE AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
 
Is it true, that large working groups are less effective than small groups? And can we adopt 
it to boards? Can we segue from too big working groups and there inefficiency into 
boards? It depends. We all know, that the agency and free-rider problem occurs when 
boards of directors become more symbolic and are indigently implemented in the 
management. There are two tools to measure the size of the board and the effectiveness. 
The first measurement was indicated by Yermack (1996). On a sample of American 
corporations he examines the relationship between Tobin’s Q and board size with the 
result, that there is a negative relationship between those two factors supporting that thesis. 
The second approach examines the view of participants in the marketplace of board size. 
Researchers find out, that boards tend to be smaller and are decreasing, because of pressure 
from active investors. Furthermore, they are decreasing, because of market participants that 
think, that small boards do monitor management better than bigger boards do. One 
problem why big boards are undesirable is, that they cause a free-rider problem. But then, 
the following question arises. Why do still big boards exist and are excepted?  
As discussed in 3.1, it depends, on whether you are estimating an equilibrium or non-
equilibrium situation or, if you are on the right or left side of Figure 1. Unfortunately, there 
is no definite answer, so there has to be more research being done on that topic. 
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3.3  EXTERNAL MONITORING AND CONTROL MECHANISMS 
 
There are internal as well as external control mechanisms, whereas both mechanisms have 
the same influence on a corporation. Board of directors, however, belong to the internal 
control mechanism. Now, I analyze three external monitoring and control mechanisms. 
 
The CEO turnover belongs to the first external monitoring and control mechanism. The 
most important responsibility of a board is to elect, monitor and in the worst case scenario, 
to replace the firm’s CEO. Therefore, there is only one way to evaluate the efficiency of a 
CEO; to look at his decisions. A large number of papers indicate, that there is a positive 
relationship between CEO turnovers and poor performance in companies1. However, there 
is an important distinction between voluntary and involuntary turnovers. Those distinctions 
are difficult to distinguish. “Voluntary turnovers are unlikely to be related to performance, 
and negative relationship between performance and CEO turnover is extremely robust 
across samples” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003, p. 14). 
So, if there is a negative relationship between performance and turnover, boards will 
probably fire the CEO. Lets consider attentively the role of the board. Weisbach (1988) 
interacts board composition and firm performance in a CEO turnover equation. To 
understand this concept, we do have to know the following to indications. First of all, if a 
board is outsider dominated, than the relationship between CEO turnover and performance 
is more sensitive than it would be with an insider-dominated board. In contrast, insider-
dominated boards do not replace CEOs on performance related reasons.  
How can we find a plausible explanation to statements mentioned above? Well, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) did find four answers explaining CEO turnover and performance 
considering board composition:  
First, “boards controlled by outside directors do a better job of monitoring the 
CEO than do boards controlled by inside directors” and that second, “inside 
directors make their turnover decisions on the basis of inside information” even 
though “insider-dominated boards are responding to performance, the 
performance they are responding to is not measurable by an outside observer”. 
Furthermore, “Inside directors’ careers tend to be tied to the CEO’s, which gives 
them incentives to advance the CEO’s career regardless of the stock price”. 
                                                 
1
 Among them are Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Weisbach (1988), 
Jensen   and Murphy (1990) and Kaplan (1994). 
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Moreover, “any potential inside information that inside directors use to justify a 
firing has to reflect negatively on the CEO without reflecting negatively on them; 
otherwise, shareholders would likely respond to the CEO’s dismissal by demanding 
a clean sweep of top management” (p. 14). 
 
Again, it is really difficult to find just one answer! Hermalin and Weisbach did need four 
attempts to state their findings. However, there are some other researchers that have found 
evidence consistent with the findings from the authors mentioned above. Borokhovich, 
Parrino and Trapani (1996), and Huson, Parrino and Starks (2000) find out, that “outsider-
dominated boards are more likely than insider-dominated boards to replace a CEO with 
someone form outside the firm” (p. 15). 
However, Perry had a remarkable finding by breaking down “the cross-sectional 
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance by whether the outside director 
are paid by using incentives” (Perry, 2000). He suggests that incentives lead the board of 
directors to better performance and that an high payment make a rather professional than 
personal relationship to the CEO and thus are more independent. 
 
Do characteristics of boards such as board size, composition and compensation really 
affect the board’s monitoring? Or do independent boards make their work correct and 
monitor more effective? Well, a board dominated by a CEO will not monitor regardless its 
characteristics. A board dominated by independent directors, however, is paid with 
incentives and so arrange themselves regarding factors like size, composition and 
performance. 
 
The second external monitoring and control mechanism are takeovers. Activities on the 
takeover market provide a laboratory of information for board actions and composition. 
We now do know, that boards do effect the quality of corporate governance and influence 
shareholders and we also know, that those actions can effect takeover decisions. 
Shivdasani is one of the leaders evaluating such processes and find three interpretations of 
acquiring hostile takeovers with a majority of outside directors on boards. At first, the 
quality of outside directors’ decisions depends on the quantity of outside directors in 
boards. It is an important measurement of whether being taken over or not. Then, 
Shivdasani (1993) found out, that “directors in higher demand will turn down directorship 
opportunities at poorly managed firms, which are more prone to being acquired”. The last 
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interpretation states that the quantity of outside-director-positions hold by an outsider 
depends on his reputation. If he has a good reputation, he will get more outside director 
positions in more companies than having a bad reputation. Shortly, if he does not want to 
maximize his property in the firm at first case, but work for the shareholders’ interests, he 
will get more positions as an outsider. 
Furthermore, Shivdasani (1993) finds that “controlling board seats appears to affects the 
takeover process” and that “board composition of a potential target is an important factor 
in the takeover process”.  
 
An important factor of influence regarding takeovers are poison pills. Investopedia (n. d.) 
defines poison pills as follows: 
“A strategy used by corporations to discourage hostile takeovers. With a poison 
pill, the target company attempts to make its stock less attractive to the acquirer. 
There are two types of poison pills:  
1. By purchasing more shares cheaply (flip-in), investors get instant profits and, 
more importantly, they dilute the shares held by the acquirer. This makes 
the takeover attempt more difficult and more expensive.  
2. An example of a flip-over is when shareholders gain the right to purchase the 
stock of the acquirer on a two-for-one basis in any subsequent merger”. 
Furthermore, poison pills, when used correctly, can protect the current management at the 
expense of shareholders. Additionally, the bargaining position can be increased by poison 
pills, when a takeover appertains. Furthermore, poison pills have positive as well as 
negative reactions on stock markets; positive, when the majority of the board are 
independent, negative, when it does not.  Hence, boards with a majority of outsiders should 
adopt poison pills for their shareholders’ interests. Insider-dominated boards should use 
poison pills to entrench management.  
 
Finally, the third external monitoring and control mechanism I am dealing with is the 
executive compensation. Another important role of the board of directors is to introduce 
the compensation policies for management. The board has to control if these 
compensations are too high or too low. Specifically Core, Holthausen & Larcker (1999) 
find that “ CEO pay rises with the number of outsiders appointed during the CEO’s tenure, 
and about whose appointments the CEO therefore had a says. CEO pay also rises with 
variables likely to indicate a lack of board involvement […]”. Those variables are board 
18 
 
size, the quantity of directors over age sixty-nine and the number of directors that hold 
other directorships, also called “busy” directors. However, the more successful a CEO is, 
the higher is his compensation. The so called pay-performance- relationship indicates, that 
the higher the board size, the lower the incentives to bear more risk and the lower the 
compensation. 
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4 BOARD REFORMS 
 
 
The takeover activity during the 1980s in the U.S. and around the world are a significant 
reason of increasing conflicts between managers and shareholders, while because of 
increasing competition, the firm performance could not be neglected. Furthermore, 
directors approved extraordinarily high compensations without justifying themselves and 
failed to minimize financial manipulation and so, directors are the ones whose fault is the 
breakdown of worldwide operating major firms. Boards of directors did not monitor them 
adequately and so, improvement has to be done.  
In the late 1990s, board reforms started to flourish due to scandals of well-known 
corporations such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat. “Law-makers in the EU, the USA, 
and elsewhere took the view that weak boards were a distinct feature of companies 
engaging in fraud and had to be reformed so as to play effectively their first-line-of-
defence role against corporate malpractice” (European Commission). Due to this, both the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Delaware judiciary think about giving 
the shareholders more of a say in board elections. However, board reforms are kind of 
inefficient considering the board’s multiple functions such as strategy setting, management 
monitoring, crisis management and regulatory compliance for example. Furthermore, 
reforms make mistakes such as short-term rebuilding confidence of investors or calming 
down shareholders’ anger to next elections.  
 
Board reforms can be divided in three broad categories. The first is the constraining of 
discretion by reinforcing the powers of shareholders and auditors. The second category 
aims reinforcing board independence and finally, directors incentives are targeted through 
compensations and provisions.  
Reinforcing the powers of shareholders and auditors will constrain board discretion. In 
the USA, board elections are performed by the firm’s executives, whereas in Europe 
controlling block holders reinforce their power over the board by minimizing corporate 
affairs of small shareholders. However, there are two options of unsatisfied shareholders 
with board nominees, though. The first option is to “mount a costly and uncertain 
campaign for rival proxies” (Hertig, 2005, p. 271). The second is to keep back their vote. 
The latter option indicates the board of directors opposition, but is not binding.  
20 
 
While the Delaware judiciary wants to find a solution to increase shareholders’ powers to 
vote out the unwanted directors with representatives of institutional investors, “in Europe, 
by contrast “the focus is on giving the general meeting the right to vote on remuneration 
policies and stock option plans” (Hertig, 2005, p. 271). The UK Combined Code for 
example, allows investors in listed companies an advisory vote on executive pay plans with 
the effect to force corporations to take into account their investors opinion. Additionally, 
“the European Commission recommends that member states let shareholders of listed 
companies vote on director remuneration policies as well as on schemes under which 
directors are remunerated in shares or share options, or on the basis of share movement” 
(Hertig, 2005, p. 271). Well, the new German policies containing a strong union and 
political pressure are a standard practice in the UK.  
Board powers also fall prey to board reforms. In the USA, reforms are aiming to constrain 
the auditors because of their complacency. Furthermore, “the USA has taken the lead by 
requiring auditors to attest the adequacy of internal controls over financial data” (Section 
404, Sarbanes-Oxley Act-SOX). This requirement forces directors to acquiesce to auditor 
instructions until the directors are ready to inform investors about not dealing with material 
weaknesses which were identified by the audit. Hence, board discretion will be reduced. In 
Europe, however, the European Commission proposes to reinforce the independence of 
auditors with the adaptation of a Directive, which reinforces the independence of auditors 
by limiting dismissals of restricting auditors and by boards, that have to participate in audit 
executions.  
 
Another very important category of board reforms is to reinforce board independence. 
Hertig (2005) find that the set up of boards of directors should contain a majority of 
independent directors and the separation of CEO and board chairpersons. However, to 
reinforce board independence and to improve boards, we do have to define the term 
independent directors at first. The revised New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) defines 
independent directors as “those having ‘no material relationship’ with the listed 
company”, while the UK Combined Code invokes to “non-existence to ‘relationship or 
circumstances that are likely to affect or appear to affect the director’s judgement” 
(Hertig, 2005, p. 272).  
While independence is still defined as being released from family members, business ties 
and other relationships, the “examples of non-independence have been relegated to an 
‘additional guidance’ annex” (Hertig, 2005, p. 272). As you might see, the factor 
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independence is not only question mark of board composition and board structure, but also 
of the detailed board procedures. Furthermore, both the NYSE and the European 
Commission accentuate the need for the board of directors to evaluate their own 
performance.   
 
The director incentives is the last of overall three categories of board reforms. The NYSE 
wants the audit committee to be financially literate and that at least one of them has an area 
of expertise in accounting or financial management. The European Commission, however, 
wants to have boards with members of sane judgement, expertise and specific knowledge 
to complete their tasks. Furthermore, the European Commission recommends that listed 
companies are under obligation to reveal the compensation data of directors containing 
information about “the variable and non-variable remuneration, as well as information 
about non-cash and retirement benefits” (Hertig, 2005, p. 2712). We will see, if less board 
friendly reforms will change the profit seeking point of view of directors on shareholders. 
 
4.1 DOES ONE SIZE FITS ALL? 
 
There is a wide-spread variety of different organizations around the world. There are listed 
and non-listed publicly held firms and of course, privately held firms. But, there is just one, 
but very doubtful factor on board reforms. Those of the said “board reforms have de facto 
one-size-fits-all consequences, which raises efficiency issues” (Hertig, 2005, p. 273). 
Nonetheless, there are still cultural differences, financial structures and different ownership 
structures that have to be considered in reforms and so, Hertig (2005) thinks it is “naïve to 
believe that firms can easily avoid compliance”, because of standardization effects that 
emerge due to corporate governance provisions. The first effect, the default nature of 
governance codes, can cause high costs to non-compliance companies, even without 
having particular advantages. The second effect, however, is that financial analysts have to 
be integrated in several publicly held corporations to engage specific governance 
assessments. Thus, there is a one-size-fits-all matter, because of firms “that by examining 
the magnitude of changes induced by the board” are likely “to be subject to 
disproportionate costs” (Hertig, 2005, p. 274). 
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4.2 MINIMUM STANDARDS, NOT “BEST PRACTICES” 
 
The reformers of corporate governance are of the opinion that they provide “’best 
practice’ or ‘good governance’ provisions” (Hertig, 2005, p. 274). However, researchers 
do not think so and refer more to ‘average practice’ and ‘minimum standards’. In general, 
though, reforms tend to trace instead of causing changes in board of directors. “Hence, 
recent board reforms do not seem to have had a significant impact” (Hertig, 2005, p. 274). 
Furthermore, directors of the European Union noticed that corporate governance reforms 
do not make any difference at all and do not even have an effect of the directors’ 
remuneration. Additionally, board changes are not caused because of regulatory changes; 
they are caused due to market forces! Due to this, market shocks are caused by adjustments 
of the US board structure and not as many people think, because of regulatory reforms. 
However, is there an explanation why actually the so called ‘best practices’ are no more 
than ‘minimum’ standards only? Yes, there are three explanations trying to answer this 
question. The first explanation is that board reforms prefer to be ineffective than to be 
called an inefficient innovation. Then, the ‘minimum’ standard is not really that easy to 
implement in corporations and third, the regulatory capture plagues the reform process.  
 
In the next section I will clarify that board reforms are both inefficient and insufficient 
anyway and does not produce better results. 
 
4.3 EFFICIENCY AND REGULATORY CAPTURE SIZE 
 
In this section I will show you some issues containing both efficiency and regulation. 
Inefficiencies can be minimized by adopting largely similar governance forms worldwide 
to minimize transactions. Then, trade-offs should be taken into account and because of an 
increasing number of shareholders, corporations should watch for opportunistic behaviour 
by controlling or minority shareholders. Another important issue is that reinforcing the 
monitoring function of board of directors can interfere with the boards tasks to carry out 
the strategy function. Considering these standards and taking into account multiple factors 
worldwide, reforms can be either inefficient or inadequate. 
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4.3.1 Trade-offs 
 
Evidence shows that reformers forgot to take factors such as trade-offs into account and so, 
there is an impact functions of the board, on the role of gatekeepers and at last but not least 
on the compensation. I am going to present you those impacts in the section below. 
 
 
4.3.1.1  Functions of the board 
 
The board of directors has many important functions such as setting strategies, approving 
corporate actions, monitoring functions and risk management. Those functions depend on 
the shareholder structure, firm size and firm specific corporate governance as well as other 
things. However, two factors do attract attention by reformers; the monitoring and the 
conflict-of-interest function. The reason for attraction attention are simply. At first, 
scandals have shown examples of “non-compliance with accounting and disclosure 
requirements” (Hertig, 2005, p. 275). Second, because of not paying attention to related-
party transactions, the asset diversion was facilitated by managers and controlling 
shareholders.  
The result of reforms on boards is, that the core reform is the director independence and so 
reformers chose “to adopt a combined structure and relationship approach” (Hertig, 
2005, p. 275). As mentioned before, independence provisions belong to directors with no 
personal or financial links with the company or its managers or even controlling 
shareholders. Another problem constitute the so called ‘no relationship’ director. This kind 
of directors may have poor knowledge about the corporation’s business activities, but in 
contrast, boards with a majority of trustful ‘no relationship’ directors soften conflicts of 
interests. Additionally, the risk of information reduction increases because of the scope of 
definitions of independence. Another, but very important problem to deal with is the 
quality of strategic decisions regarding industry and firm specific knowledge. This 
deficiency will be reinforced when board independence reduces cooperation between 
managers and directors. So, it is important to work on that issue, because evidence 
indicates that the most successful boards are those where insiders as well as outsiders work 
together and not against each other. Furthermore, “board independence is a function of 
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negotiations between the CEO and directors, the result of which varies with CEO quality, 
which in turns effects policy” (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). 
However, proceedings between CEOs and directors hold a mirror up to a high request for 
board members that are able to act as outsider advisors rather than belonging to ‘no-
relationship’ directors. In the USA, outside directors are more common in the pre-
deregulation period than thereafter, for example. Nevertheless, it is more efficient to have 
outside directors on board that are in pursue to fulfil an important advisory function. 
Recapitulating, there is a need of independent outside directors, but it is still unclear, in 
what kind of degree of independence they are needed. 
 
Those discernments admit following improvement suggestions for board reformers. First 
of all, reformers should omit to adopt too detailed rules. Second, a minimum independence 
standard should be composed as general as possible and finally, too detailed lists with the 
field of duties should avoid costly unwanted consequences that would change boards.  
 
4.3.1.2 Role of Gatekeepers 
 
Board reformers should contemplate the role of gatekeeper issue. To do so, reformers 
should recruit independent auditors with a financial expertise to reinforce independence 
and power. 
However, gate keeper reforms are very costly. Those reforms may force the board of 
directors to avoid costs of non-compliance with regulated standards for the risk-averse 
auditors. Furthermore, those reforms would increase the monitoring function of the board 
by putting auditing issues at the forefront. However, it cannot be denied that audit 
committees did not performed tolerable. Coffee (2002) states “that past US limitations on 
auditor liability risk had resulted in auditors becoming more complacent and less likely to 
discover or deter asset diversion or financial misrepresentations”.  
Anyway, researches still do not understand why reformers do have to deal with audit issues 
such detailed as they do. Summarized, reformers have adopted rules that are too detailed 
considering the independence issue.  
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4.3.1.3 Compensation 
 
According to board reformers, corporations should have a compensation committee 
composed of independent directors in majority or in total. Various codes recommend 
outside consultants for benchmarking compensations on which to judge managerial 
performance. The idea behind this is stop executives from maximizing short-term earning 
per share. 
Reforms considering the compensation do have some flaws too. First of all, managers are 
not only motivated by money and so, it can unleash an adverse selection effect by picking 
out those, who are not money oriented. Second, an inefficient compensation will increase, 
if additional compensation advisors are hired. And finally, consultants get into the habit of 
operating as head hunters whose earnings depend on their candidates’ remuneration by 
reinforcing their self-esteem driven behaviour.  
Summarized, reforms are still needed, but performance related incentives for outsiders are 
difficult, though. There is evidence, that when the board does not have enough 
independence, even a very well paid CEOs tend to perform badly. On the other hand, 
shareholder will gain because of a collusion between executives and board of directors, if 
the firing risk is limited by reducing compensation. Furthermore, institutional investors do 
have an important compensation-monitoring role. So, this monitoring role “reduces the 
need for regulatory intervention” (Hertig, 2005, p. 278). 
As assumed, there is the same conclusion for compensation as for board functions as well 
as for gatekeepers. Board reforms have too detailed rules! Such an extraordinarily detailed 
catalogue of rules have “the advantage of reducing legal uncertainty and constraining 
judicial activism”, the disadvantage, however, compared “to the costs resulting from the 
failure properly to take into account trade-offs faced by larger firms and one-size-fits-all 
effects for smaller firms […] that is reinforced by regulatory capture considerations” 
(Hertig, 2005, p. 278). 
 
4.3.2 Regulatory capture 
 
Altogether, board reforms are either transparent nor democratic and so there are two 
consequences of self-regulation and political entrepreneurs.  
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First of all, small investors have been ignored. However, institutional investors do have an 
interest in reforms and so, they provide financial and political private benefits to their 
controllers. They also permit their managers to blame the boards of operational companies, 
when performances are not given. Here are some examples of inefficient institutional 
investors influence. Rules on the separation of CEOs and chairmen of the board have been 
adopted, regardless of the fact that their benefits can be lower than their costs. 
Furthermore, fund managers may want to disclosure their compensation data because of 
trying to justify their salaries and deflecting their own performance. At last but not least, 
the negative effect of balance among board emerge because of provisions of board 
independence. This board independence would reflect investors’ view of the directors 
monitoring role. 
 
Second, a lot of issues are ignored by reformers. However, although issues such as board 
collective decision making, compensation structure, institutional investor governance and 
individual shareholder monitoring were solved, there is still a lot of work to do. The 
managers and owners of institutional investors, for example, do not want to be the “target 
of board independence or retail investor protection regulation” (Hertig, 2005, p. 279). 
Hertig (2005) states that the American mutual fund industry for example, has “strongly 
opposed the adoption of new SEC rules requiring that the chairman as well as 75 per cent 
of mutual fund board members be independent” (p. 279).  
As mentioned before, here, too, reformers should avoid too detailed rules and focus on 
more relevant topics. One of those relevant topics is to assume, “that institutional investor 
board deficiencies resemble board deficiencies in operational firms” (Hertig, 2005, p. 
279). Furthermore, minimum standards should be examined if funds require specific 
intervention, when funds do have more individuals rather than institutions. Honestly, we 
can not deny that board reforms have suffered from regulations. However, it is still good 
for the extent that involvements of management, controlling and shareholders as well as 
institutional investors prevent ineffective regulatory interference. 
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4.4 RESULTS OF BOARD REFORMS 
 
Board reforms were performed to obtain investor’s confidence and to shatter the bad 
boards and to support good boards. As we have seen before, reforms were conducted into 
too detailed circumstances and so, two major disadvantages occurred. The first problem 
facing reforms of board of directors are the new standing rules that were forced due to 
market forces and regulations. Those rules were not only implemented in large listed 
industrialized jurisdictions, but also in small and non-listed companies in emerging 
markets. Due to this, reforms gained the reputation to be a ‘costly one-size-fits-all 
product’. Second, trade-offs were taken into account because of regulatory implications 
being too detailed and being scared of negative impacts of failing. Furthermore, interest 
groups started to avoid reforms that would significantly endanger their private benefits.  
Now, reformers are trying to simplify the ‘minimum standards’ and so, to minimize trade-
offs and ‘one-size-fits-all’ issues even for small corporations. Furthermore, they have to 
distinguish between operational firms and other financial institutions. Just because most 
reforms are good for operational firms, does not mean it is good for pension funds and 
mutual funds as well as other financial institutions. Reforms are supposed to be more 
flexible and help all kind of corporations or financial institutions. 
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5 BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND GLOBALIZATION 
 
 
As mentioned before, there are different organizational and financial institutions and 
different types of boards of directors. However, is there a single corporate governance 
system that is the best and can be adopted by all corporations worldwide?  
To answer this question we do have to pick the most particularly promising characteristics 
of worldwide corporate governance institutions and clarify the following differences. First 
of all, we do have to differentiate the identities of owners of corporations and the size 
distribution of their ownership stakes. Then we have to understand and finally differentiate 
the governance structure such as number – one tier boards (the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ company 
law) and two-tier boards (the Continental European company law) - and size as well as the 
composition of the monitoring boards. At last but not least, we have to realize differences 
in legal and political institutions that affect managerial behaviour. 
 
Understanding those varieties considering differences in economic performance as well as 
corporate-governance systems, we will clarify the governance systems around the world 
and learn some facts about legal systems as well as politics. Furthermore, I am going to 
introduce to you some important factors of globalization and implicate those new findings 
to the global market. 
 
5.1 GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
 
In section 2, ‘How are board of directors structured?’, I have presented you the four 
groups of owners in detail; the insider, outsiders and institutional holders as well as the 
independent directors. However, now I am going to present you the differences between 
the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ models and finally, their governance systems. 
 
Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004) indicate that the outsider model is a governance 
system, in “which ownership stakes are dispersed, and owners exercise indirect control on 
management by electing representatives to the monitoring boards, or perhaps by voting on 
specific proposals of management” (p. 130). Furthermore, Gugler et al. (2004) define 
insider government systems, in “which ownership stakes are concentrated and the major 
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stakeholders are directly represented on the boards that monitor managers and perhaps in 
management itself” (p. 130). 
The outsider governance system is represented in the USA and in UK and is consequently 
called the ‘Anglo-Saxon system”, whereas the insider governance system which is 
represented in the German speaking countries – Austria, Germany, Switzerland and some 
other Continental European countries - is therefore called the ‘Germanic system’. In this 
system, control is typically unidirectional. Furthermore, there is a ‘Japanese form’ of an 
insider governance system, which is represented in Japan and is called ‘keiretsu’. In the 
latter insider model, several corporations are linked together through interlocking 
directorships that are mostly intertwined, where control is multidirectional. ‘Keiretsu’ is 
represented by banks and other financial institutions. 
 
5.1.1 “Anglo-Saxon system” 
 
In the USA, the board of directors’ task is to appoint and dismiss the managers, to approve 
payments and acquisitions and to decide on important strategies. Boards are elected by the 
shareholders at their annual meetings that is typically nominated by the management. 
Furthermore, in the U.S. each board of directors is required to have a couple of directors 
that are actually not members of management and where the majority of directors are 
outsiders. The advantages of management representing the boards is the qualitative know 
how and best knowledge of their companies’ operations and strategies to decide whether 
acquire a new plant or not. The advantage of having outside directors on boards is their 
favour to support shareholders over the management. Hence, conflicts are the order of the 
day, of course. 
 
In the UK, the board of directors’ composition do have to contain of at least two directors 
who can be managers or not; it is simply their choice. However, due to the Cadbury Code 
in 1990, outside directors are an requirement in UK boards, although the size differs from 
corporation to corporation. Apart from that, UK boards are the same as US board of 
directors. 
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5.1.2 “Germanic system” 
 
Another very important and in German speaking countries such as Austria, Germany and  
Switzerland as well as some other Continental European countries, common two-board 
governance system is the ‘Germanic system’. The ‘Vorstand’ decides whether to introduce 
new products or not, to cut prices and manages the firm, in general. The ‘Vorstand’ is 
responsible for day-to-day decisions. 
 
Then we have the ‘Aufsichtsrat’, were managers are no members of the board of directors. 
The ‘Aufsichtsrat’ has following responsibilities: It has to appoint the members of the 
‘Vorstand’, approve dividends and the company’s accounts and decide on investments. 
The ‘Aufsichtsrat’ is elected by the representatives of the employees and unions and by the 
shareholders. Furthermore, in corporations (Aktiengesellschaften) with a minimum of 2000 
employees, fifty percent of the seats are occupied by representatives by shareholders and 
fifty percent by representatives by employees. In German corporations the ‘Aufsichtsrat’ 
plays the role of outside directors of U.S. and UK companies. Furthermore, a very 
important issue is that ‘Aufsichtsrat’ has a limited range of rights. It can only control 
managers of the corporation in extreme circumstances by not renewing their contract or 
blocking proposed mergers.  
 
5.1.3 Business Groups: “Keiretsu” and “Chaebol” 
 
‘Keiretsu’ is the Japanese form of an insider system, where several companies are linked 
together through interlocking directors. These companies – Japanese conglomerates – are 
supported by cross-holdings of one another’s shares. Financial institutions and/or banks 
belong to the conglomerates that hold shares in those companies. Furthermore, the main 
bank and some other financial institutions are represented on the conglomerate’s 
supervisory board. An important aspect is the multi-directional control, where each 
company belonging to the ‘Keiretsu’ is able to exercise some control over the companies 
that control it.  
Additionally, there is a single board of directors that is dominated by managers; over three-
quarters of a board’s members are managers. As a consequence, Japanese shareholders will 
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be protected from their board of directors in situations involving conflicts with 
management.  
 
‘Chaebol’, however, is the Korean form of the Japanese ‘Keiretsu’. Gugler et al. (2004, p. 
132) describe the Korean model as being “a hybrid between the German corporate 
pyramid and the Japanese keiretsu”. The top position of the structure is filled by the 
founding family, who can perpetuate their empires through cross-shareholdings among the 
member companies that result in an imbalance between control and ownership rights. 
Furthermore, the founding families can maintain their power, thus control by the fact, that 
banks and other financial institutions do not play a monitoring role in the company. In the 
late 1990s, the Asian crisis pressurized the Korean ‘Chaebol’ and their affiliated banks and 
so, some companies completely withdraw from day-to-day management and started to 
restructure the entire group. International investors were placed in management positions 
and parts of the companies were partitioned and sold. Due to many changes in ‘Chaebol’, 
predictions concerning the future Korean corporate government structure are difficult. 
 
5.2 LEGAL SYSTEMS AND POLITICS 
 
In this section you will gain information about the legal systems including issues of 
protection and the agency-cost problems. Furthermore, I am going to show why European 
laws are as good as American laws and the political point of view of agency costs. 
 
5.2.1 Legal systems 
 
Shareholder’s protection differs form country to country and so do country legal 
institutions. In some country shareholder are allowed to access the names and addresses of 
all other shareholders to be able to call a special meeting. In other countries this is 
impossible because of data privacy acts. La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) examined the content and developed of legal institutions in different countries to 
determine which ones best align shareholder and managerial interests. They found out, that 
there is a greater protection against managerial abuse in the ‘Anglo-Saxon system’ than in 
civil law systems. In the civil law systems, French, German and Scandinavian systems 
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were compared and results indicate, that the French systems offers the shareholders the 
least protection, and the best protection provides the Scandinavian system.  
 
The agency-costs offer another problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain, that “an 
owner-manager who decides to issue equity bears all of the agency costs from this action”. 
Hence, there are two predictions explaining the agency-cost issue. First of all, however, the 
greater the agency costs, the less incentive founders of firms have to issue equity. 
Furthermore, high agency costs signify the weak protection of shareholder. The first 
prediction is, that equity markets will be thinner in countries with poor shareholder 
protection. The second prediction indicates that ownership concentration is higher in 
countries with poor shareholder protection.  
 
It is important to mention the question, why do actually legal institutions affect the 
economic performance of countries? One reason is, that legal systems distinguish in 
different countries, so do mechanisms protecting small shareholders. Countries either have 
strong or weak mechanisms to protect shareholders. If the shareholder protection is strong, 
more shareholders will invest in the market, because they trust it and so, the market will 
grow. If the shareholder protection is weak, shareholders will not invest and so, the market 
will shrink. Another reason is the protection offered to citizens of a specific country, and 
not the protection of common-law systems. Evidence shows that if stronger protection of 
property rights are provided, common-law systems will protect citizens from the arbitrary 
expropriations of property that occur in civil-law systems. Additionally, this protection 
provides greater incentives to enter into new contract and to start new businesses as well as 
make investments, which lead to a great growth. 
Figure 2 shows the comovement in various stock markets in 1995. Thereby, most of the 
emerging markets have strong comovements. 
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Figure 2: Comovement in Various Stock Markets in 1995. Source: Morck, R., Yeung, B., 
2002, p. 24 
 
5.2.2 Politics 
 
Although there are differences in ownership and capital market structure between 
European and American corporations, European laws are as good as U.S. laws. However, 
countries such as Germany and France would have more economic advantages if they 
would adopt the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ corporate governance system. The problem, however, lies 
in their politics and not in their legal systems. 
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Furthermore, agency costs are higher in democracies than in other countries. The reason is, 
that “social democracies do not strongly control public firm agency costs because they do 
not want unbridled shareholder-wealth maximization, and, hence, by weakening 
shareholder-wealth maximization institutions, they widen the gap between managers and 
dispersed shareholders” (Gugler et al., 2004, p. 138). So, large firms that are publicly held 
are unstable when the spread is wide enough and are leaded with the so called ‘American-
style’. Furthermore, in social democracies, small shareholders can opt for fixed-income 
forms of investments over common equity, to be better protected. And those “who do own 
common equity in social democracies prefer large blocks, which offer them some 
protection against managers’ opportunistic behaviour” (Gugler et al., 2004, p. 138).  
 
 
5.3 FACTORS OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
In this section, you will learn about the most important factors of globalizational 
performance in detail. Furthermore you will be able to differentiate them and so understand 
the performance driven decision making criteria considering board of directors. 
 
5.3.1 Ownership identity and concentration 
 
Summarized, board of directors are divided into four dominant categories of owners; the 
inside directors, outside directors and institutional portfolio holders as well as independent 
directors.  
For an easier understanding and the course of my diploma thesis, I worked out the details 
of the ‘ownership identity and concentration’ in section 2. Please see section 2 for detailed 
information.  
 
 
5.3.2  Corporate boards 
 
One important topic considering corporate boards are the effects of board characteristics 
on board actions. As mentioned before, there are two important factors; their size and 
composition. We already know that if the board of directors is small, dominated by 
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outsiders and the firm is performing badly, the CEO will be removed pretty fast. 
Additionally, if the majority of directors in a board are outsiders, the corporation will not 
be the target of hostile takeovers so easily because of doing harm to their shareholders’. 
Another factor is the board size, which is linked with the pay-for-performance issue. Is the 
board of directors large, the link between firm performance and CEO payment is weak. 
Gugler et al. (2004) find that these results indicate that board actions which should 
“improve a company’s performance are positively related to the fraction of outside 
directors on the board, and negatively related to its size” (p. 143).  
 
Another important issue considering boards are the effects of board characteristics on 
firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) find some evidence, that “there is little 
to suggest that board composition has any cross-sectional relationship to firm 
performance” (p. 12). This means, that a high number of outside directors worsens the 
performance of corporations because of their deficit in specific knowledge compared to 
insiders. However, bad managers are more likely to be replaced by outsiders which, in 
contrary, increases the performance. The effect of these two tendencies is to minimize or 
rather eliminate the systematic relationship between board composition and firm 
performance. 
 
5.3.3 Legal systems 
 
There a many countries that differ in their legal rules and regulations as well as in their 
economic situation, but legal scholars believe that some national legal systems become 
adequately similar to permit classification of national legal systems into major families of 
law2. Additionally, Zweigert and Kotz (1998) find that the following factors are decisive 
for the lifestyle of a legal system or a legal family: “(1) its historical background and 
development, (2) its predominant and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters, (3) 
especially distinctive institutions, (4) the kind of legal sources it acknowledges and the way 
it handles them, and (5) its ideology” (p. 68). 
 
                                                 
2
 Among them are David and Brierley (1985), Reynolds and Flores (1989), Glendon et al. (1992, 1994) and   
Zweigert and Kotz (1998). 
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Occasionally, countries adopt laws from different legal traditions, but generally, one 
tradition dominates in each country. Furthermore, it is important to mention, that the key 
feature of legal traditions is that they have been transplanted from a country into another. 
By the use of transplantations, the national laws of most countries changed, generated and 
adopted some basic legal infrastructure (legal codes, legal principles, parts of the judiciary 
organization and judiciary) to local circumstances. Furthermore, cultural, political, 
historical and economic conditions are reflected in the countries’ national laws, so that no 
country will have identical legal and regulatory systems. However, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer (2007, p. 5) find that today, many developing countries “are heavily 
over-regulated in crucial spheres of economic life, in part because of their legal origin 
heritage”. 
 
In general, there are two main legal traditions; the common law and the civil law tradition. 
In the latter, there are several sub-traditions, more precisely, the French, German, 
Scandinavian and socialist.  
The common law legal tradition includes the law of England and its former colonies. “The 
common law is formed by appellate judges who establish precedents by solving specific 
legal disputes. Dispute resolution tends to be adversarial rather than inquisitorial.” (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2007, p. 8). Furthermore, both the executive judicial 
independence and legislature judicial independence are central. Mahoney (2001) finds that 
“English common law developed because landed aristocrats and merchants wanted a 
system of law that would provide strong protections for property and contract rights, and 
limit the crown’s ability to interfere in markets” (p. 504). The common law legal tradition 
spread to the British colonies, including Australia, Canada, India, South Africa, the United 
States and many other countries. 
The civil law legal tradition, however, is the oldest, the most widely distributed and hence, 
most influential law tradition. The civil law tradition originates in Roman law, “uses 
statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material, and 
relies heavily on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate rules” (Merryman, 1969). The 
dispute resolution is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. In the Middle Ages, Roman law 
was rediscovered in Italy. It was adopted by the Catholic Church and from there, a basis of 
secular laws was formed in many European countries. 
The French civil law tradition can be identified with the French Revolution and 
Napoleon’s codes in the 19th century. The French civil law, in contrast to the common law 
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tradition, was developed because of the revolutionary generation and Napoleon. They 
wished more state power to alter property rights and tried to insure that judges did not 
interfere. “Thus, 
quite apart from the substance of legal rules, there is a sharp difference between the 
ideologies underlying common and civil law, with the latter notably more comfortable 
with the centralized and activist government” (Mahoney, 2001, p. 505). 
Napoleon’s armies introduced his codes into Belgium, some parts of Germany, Italy and 
the Netherlands. In the colonial era, the French law influenced the Near East and Northern 
and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Indochina and Oceania. Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain 
and some Swiss cantons were also influenced by Napoleon. Furthermore, in the 19th 
century, when the Portuguese and Spanish empires where dissolved in Latin America, the 
French civil law tradition was mainly adopted. At the same time, the French civil law 
tradition was modified and finally adopted by the Russian Empire influencing the Russian 
Empire’s neighbouring regions too. After the Russian Revolution, these countries adopted 
the socialist law. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, these countries returned to the 
French civil law. 
The German civil law tradition originates in Roman law. The German Commercial Code, 
however, was written after Bismarck’s unification of Germany, in 1897. The German civil 
law shares many characteristics with the French system, but admits greater judicial law-
making. Countries such as Austria, the former Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan, Korea and some countries of the former Soviet Union 
were influenced by the German legal tradition. Because of Germany’s short-lived colonial 
influence, which come to an end by World War I, just a few countries belong to the 
German civil law. 
The Scandinavian civil law tradition is therefore seen as a part of the civil law tradition, 
“although its law is less derivative of Roman law than the French and German families” 
(Zweigert and Kotz, 1998). As well as in the German civil law tradition, there are just a 
few countries that belong to the Scandinavian civil law. The reason is, that Scandinavian 
countries did not have any colonies. 
The socialist civil law tradition originates in the Soviet Union and was spread by the 
Soviet armies to the former Soviet republics and then to Eastern Europe. This civil law was 
tradition was also implemented by some socialist states such as Mongolia and China. After 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe replaced 
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the socialist civil law by either the French or German civil law. However, there are still 
some countries, such as Cuba, maintaining the socialist legal system. 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of legal origin of commercial laws worldwide. 
 
 
Figure 3: The distribution of Legal Origin. Source: La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., 
Shleifer, A., 2007, p. 79 
 
 
In general, legal origins have effects on a variety of outcomes. First of all, it is important to 
understand, what effects emerge, when some parts of a legal system are transplanted into 
another or when adopting a system entirely. Figure 4 illustrates these effects of legal 
origins on particular laws and regulations. Furthermore, it shows the effects of these laws 
and regulations on the economic outcome. 
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Figure 4: Legal Origin, Institutions, and Outcomes. Source: La Porta, R., Lopez-de-
Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2007, p. 80 
 
 
In practical terms, a higher income per capita is associated with the following 
characteristics: A lower government ownership of banks, a better shareholder and creditor 
protection and a more efficient debt collection. Additionally, La Porta et al. (2007) 
conclude that a higher income per capita is generally associated ”with more developed 
financial markets, as reflected in a higher stock-market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio, more 
firms per capita, less ownership concentration, a lower control premium, a higher private-
credit-to-GDP ratio, and lower interest rate spreads” (p. 17). It is a fact that compared to 
common law, governments in civil law countries, especially the French legal origin, 
indicate a higher ownership of banks. Furthermore, shareholders and creditors are less 
protected and debt enforcement is less efficient. La Porta et al. (2007) determine that “The 
effect of legal origins on legal rules and financial institutions is statistically significant and 
economically large” (p. 17).  
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Furthermore, a high income per capita correlates with lower entry regulations and no 
labour regulations or conscriptions. However, both French and German legal origins 
indicate the opposite - high entry regulations and a heavy dependency on conscriptions. 
At last but not least, there is a connection between income per capita and judicial 
institutions. A low legal formalism, a short judicial tenure and no approval for case law are 
connected with a high income per capita. La Porta et al. (2007) compared common law 
countries to civil law countries and find that the latter law tradition “generally have more 
legal formalism, lower judicial tenure, and sharply lower constitutional acceptance of case 
law” (p. 19). 
Summarized, legal origins do have extensive consequences on economics. The majority of 
civil law countries are represented by the French civil law (See Figure 2). Thus, La Porta et 
al. (2007) present the following findings comparing common law to French law: 
“Compared to French civil law, common law is associated with a) better investor 
protection, which in turn is associated with improved financial development, better 
access to finance, and higher ownership dispersion, b) lighter government 
ownership and regulation, which are in turn associated with less corruption, better 
functioning labor markets, and smaller unofficial economies, and c) less formalized 
and more independent judicial systems, which are in turn associated with more 
secure property rights and better contract enforcement.” (p. 20). 
 
However, it is difficult to trade of common law against civil law to be able to say, which of 
these law traditions is the best? Naturally, “The quality of law improves on average even 
when judges pursue their policy preferences; law making does not need to be benevolent” 
La Porta et al. (2007, p. 34). 
 
5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBALIZATION  
 
After discussing plenty issues concerning board of directors, its composition and size and 
matters concerning the governance systems, we are now ready to investigate and clarify 
following questions. 
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5.4.1 What governance system is the best? 
 
At first we do have to consider the level of national income to answer this question. The 
level of national income is regarded as being a long-run measurement tool of economic 
growth assuming that all countries have started with the same low level of income. Using 
this tool to measure performance, indicating the main forms of corporate governance 
systems, result in the following findings. The main corporate governance systems 
described in 5.1 prove oneself good, because all countries that have implied it, such as the 
U.S., UK and Germany as well as France, have all become very rich. Thus, there is no 
good or bad system of corporate governance, each of them has its strengths and 
weaknesses. 
However, Gugler et al. (2004) can not support this conclusion, although they do agree with 
this statement, which is why in the present, companies in the major industrial countries 
have to deal with a more intense international competition compared to the 20th century. 
However, evidence implies, as discusses in the previous section, that the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
system is the best considering protecting shareholders “and that they lead to superior 
macroeconomic performance” (Gugler et al., 2004, p. 149). Hence, countries will achieve 
better economic performance, if they implement the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ corporate governance 
system. 
Nevertheless, there is one problem that is worth to be mentioned. The population of all 
industrial countries of the world, except for a couple of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries such as 
the U. S. and Australia are aging rapidly. Hence, the governments of these countries will 
increase taxes to be able to pay future pensions. If the government finally understand that 
changes in the corporate governance including board of directors will have a positive turn 
in the long-run and may lead to economic growth, new changes will be welcomed and 
implemented more easily. 
 
5.4.2 Are those systems converging? 
 
In the United States changes concerning strengthening the shareholders’ hands versus 
managers were noticed even before the Enron and WorldCom scandals in the beginning of 
the 21st century. Some of those changes were adopted due to the roles of institutional 
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investors and court decisions as well as SEC rulings. The US Congress came into the 
picture because of changes that were forced due to the Enron scandal.  
 
Germany and Continental Europe underwent certain changes too, however, in the 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ direction, though. But for all that, this movement is partial. Companies are 
forced to make their financial statements more transparent and so, insider trading is 
decreasing. So, many companies are adopting accounting standards in accordance with the 
International Accounting Standards Committee. The necessity to raise large amounts of 
capital due to cross-border acquisitions is the reason why German and Continental 
European companies list their securities on the London or New York stock exchanges. 
Hence, their securities are subjected “to Anglo-Saxon corporate-governance constraints 
even though their main headquarters remain outside of these countries” (Gugler et al., 
2004, p. 149). 
 
In Japan, however, the financial sector has been deregulated because of Japan’s weak 
economy, external pressures and its government. Overall, about 100 Japanese companies 
are either on the London or New York Stock Exchange and furthermore, Gugler et al. 
(2004) determine that “Over the last 15 years, members of keiretsu have been reducing 
their holdings of one another’s shares” (p.149). 
 
Finally, while taking into consideration, that a full convergence depends on many factors, I 
debate on the question, if a full convergence in corporate-governance systems will, will not 
or may be achievable.  
A full convergence will be possible, if the “best-practice technology in an industry is 
characterized by a U-shaped average cost function […]” (Gugler et al., 2004, p. 150). 
Adopting this assumption, perfect competition will avouch that companies adopting the 
best-practice technology will be on the bottom of the U-shape. In other words, increasing 
world-wide competition will result in implementing the ‘best-practice’ corporate 
governance, which is the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ system. 
A full convergence will not be achievable because, over a specific period of time, 
ownership structures change. These changes are identified by two causes, the structure-
driven and rule-driven path dependence. The ‘structure driven path dependence’ arises 
when organizations adopt new ownership structures and immolate efficiency by changing. 
Another possibility is that stakeholders such as managers and shareholders would resist 
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such a change by shifting to a new ownership structure. Additionally, the ‘rule-driven path 
dependence’ can arise for similar reasons. A country may adopt corporate governance rules 
from laws and regulations with the target to make the ownership structure more efficient, 
although at the first glimpse, being inefficient, is to their advantage. 
At last but not least, a full convergence may be possible, because in a competitive market, 
inefficient companies are not liquid and thus, go bankrupt and disappear finally. Countries, 
however, though being inefficient, can not go bankrupt that easily and can not disappear. 
The greater efficiency and growth is, the more easily it is to adopt new corporate 
governance rules and so, corporate governance should “tempt politicians to introduce these 
reforms, but there are likely to be counter pressures resisting these reforms, and it is by no 
means clear that all country governments will resist these counter pressures” (Gugler et 
al., 2004, p. 150). However, good corporate structures benefit shareholders by reducing 
managers’ discretion to pursue their own goals. It is important to understand, that if 
national parliaments are sensitive over managers than shareholders, no reforms will take 
place in the corporate governance systems! 
 
5.4.3 Will countries suffer from not being able to adopt those corporate governance    
systems strictly? 
 
Although being headquartered in countries with a strong corporate governance or having 
adopted a strong governance system, where the company and its shareholders benefit, 
managers still can lose. They may still prefer countries with a weak corporate governance 
system to pursue their own goals and so, partial movements abroad are taking place. Those 
movements happen in form of companies choosing to list their shares on foreign stock 
markets. The trend has been towards the U.S. considering more stringent requirements for 
listing shares. However, there are many other factors beyond corporate governance such as 
tax levels, labour laws, transaction costs and wage rages, to name but a few, that affect the 
location of a company. 
A company in a country with a strong corporate governance system can avoid subjecting 
itself to this system by not going public. In contrast, Gugler et al. (2004) find out 
following: 
“A company in a country with a weak corporate governance system, which is in 
need of large amounts of capital and wishes to go public, can only trap into the 
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large capital markets of the countries with strong corporate-governance systems by 
listing its shares in one of these countries” (p. 152). 
 
The following two cases are predicted by Gugler et al. (2004) on “how the globe’s 
corporate landscape might appear as globalization continues to advance” (p. 152). 
First of all, in future, there will be two types of companies worldwide, when corporate 
governance systems will not converge on a variation of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ system. There 
will be a number of large multinational companies with widely spread shares and a few 
small family controlled companies with national identities. Hence, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
companies will be headquartered in countries with a weak corporate-governance institution 
and family controlled firms will gain access to international capital markets only, when 
they have been acquired by multinationals. 
The second case is a converging corporate-governance system. Surprisingly, the same two 
categories of companies will exist, the multinationals and family controlled companies, but 
with one difference: The locations of their corporate headquarters will change. 
Additionally, capital markets and companies as well as the corporate governance systems 
will look about the same around the developed world. 
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6 CHARACTERISTICS OF EMERGING MARKETS 
 
 
Today, about thirty countries are in transition to higher levels of economic development 
and hence, adopted the name of “emerging markets” from the International Finance 
Corporation, short IFC, of the World Bank. In 1981, the IFC emerging market index 
included stocks of publicly traded companies from nine countries; the number however 
continued to grow up to thirty-three in 2002. However, the Standard & Poor’s procured the 
IFC indices and since the year 2000, they are know as the S&P/IFC indices. 
 
Emerging markets gained the investors’ interest. Before 1980, little capital flowed into 
these markets. The lack of financial products and services available to foreign investors are 
one big issue to be dealt with. The second problem is the high market risk and volatility. In 
1981, the private portfolio investment began to grow in the emerging markets and so, in 
the first half of the 1990s, the privatization and economic liberalization proceeded. Due to 
this, the securities in emerging countries enlarged for investors who developed a strong 
interest starting investing in portfolio investments.  
 
The S&P/IFC is one of the most common indices because of its broad set of countries. 
Furthermore, the S&P/IFC categorizes an market as being emerging when at least one of 
the following criteria is met. The first criteria is, being in a low- or middle income country 
which is defined by the World Bank. And when the countries’ investable market 
capitalization is lower than its most recent GDP (gross domestic product), we do have 
gained the second criteria for being an emerging market.  
Additionally, Li & Hoyer-Ellefsen (2008) define a market being “developed” as followed: 
“… if it is in a country where the GNP (gross national product) per capita exceeds 
the World Bank’s upper income threshold for at least three consecutive years and 
the investable market capitalization-to-GDP ratio is the top 25% of the emerging 
market universe for three consecutive years” (p. 2). 
Furthermore, there are five more dimensions to consider, whether a country is developed 
or belonging to an emerging market. These characteristics are market size, openness, 
efficiency and transparency as well as liquidity. 
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6.1 MARKET ORIENTED CHARACTERISTICS 
 
Market size and the size of a country’s financial market are two important factors in 
relationship with a country’s economy. Although, quantitatively compared, there are less 
emerging than developed markets, but both have a similar market capitalization on 
average. Numerical, the average GDP of the 22 developed countries is over $ 1 trillion, 
about more than six times the average of the emerging market countries. Additionally, the 
difference of these two groups are still higher comparing their GNP. There, the average of 
developed countries is about seven times higher than that from the emerging markets. 
The depth of financial markets keep apart the emerging markets from the frontier markets. 
The market depth is defined as the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, which in fact, is a 
useful indicator of the level of development in an economy’s financial market. On the one 
hand, in developing countries, however, the value of the average market capitalization was 
as high as their GDP. On the other hand, the market capitalization of emerging markets is 
about one-third of their GDP, where the market depth is still higher than of a frontier 
market. Summarized, market depth is the main distinction between frontier and emerging 
market countries.  
Furthermore, there is another possibility to compare emerging and developed markets; by 
the number of listed firms. Except for a few large developed countries such as the U.S., 
Japan and the U.K., developed and emerging markets have about the same number of 
listings. However, comparing the size of listed firms, emerging markets have a smaller 
market capitalization than developed market listings have. 
 
Market openness and market activity can be examined using the S&P/IFC Global Index 
and the Investment Index. The Global Index represents the market and includes the most 
actively traded firms in the market and captures the majority of the total market 
capitalization of all listed stocks. So, firms in the Global Index are bigger and do trade 
more actively, in general. Hence, those companies do represent a majority of the market 
capitalization and trading intensity in each market. 
Due to the fact, that not all markets are open for foreign investors and that stakes for a 
particular stock may be limited, the Investment Index captures the global exposure of 
companies in a market for foreign investors. Evidence shows, that about 18 firms in 
emerging markets are 100% open for foreign investors. The other 15 companies are closed 
or do have restrictions on foreign ownership. According to Li and Hoyer-Ellefsen (2008), 
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these restrictions include “special classes of shares for foreign owners, limits on foreign 
ownership, limits on ownership held by a single foreign shareholder, company-imposed 
limits that differ from national law, national limits on aggregate foreign ownership” (p. 4). 
Furthermore, S&P/IFC implemented three additional criteria. The first criteria is that 
stocks do have to have $ 50 million for a minimum of an investable market capitalization. 
Then, over the last year, the stock must have traded at least $ 20 million and finally, the 
stock must have traded on at least half of the local exchange trading days.  
Finally, a market is ‘open’ with a high proportion of firms being in the Global Index and 
passing the screen for the involvement in the Investable Index. In contrast, ‘closed’ 
markets are exclusionary of foreign investors. 
 
In general, stock markets indicate a country’s market efficiency by processing information 
about individual companies, which derive from the trades of informed investors. To gain as 
much information as possible from a stock market’s efficiency and to understand the co-
movements more easily, the variation of stock returns has to be divided into a market-
related and firm-specific component.  
The market-related component of stock return variation contains market movements that 
are common across most stocks. To understand the market-related returns on variation, an 
example will illustrate the results. If an anti-business government is elected, the prices of 
stocks will fall en masse. If the central bank, in contrast, stimulates the economy by 
reducing interest rates, the price of almost all stocks will rise as one.  
The firm-specific component of stock return variation contains unique stock price 
movements for a single company. An example will illustrate this component of stock 
return variation as follows: If a company is hit with a product liability lawsuit, it is highly 
probable that the company’s share price will fall. However, little or almost nothing will 
happen to the stock prices of other companies across the economy. 
Richard Roll (1988) finds that market-related price movements are often connected with 
major news announcements, while firm-specific price movements are a result of trades of 
stock prices being pushed up and down by informed investors. Furthermore, firm-specific 
information is more complete in developed stock markets than in emerging markets and so, 
the absence of firm-specific price movements in emerging markets are the consequence. 
 
Now, I am going to probe the causes of this problem in more detail. In the US, Canada, 
Ireland and actually all other developed economies, stock prices move quite independently 
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of each other. In emerging markets, however, it is not the case. There, stocks tend to fall 
and rise en masse. Morck and Yeung (2002) get to the bottom of it and they find that this 
fact does not appear to be because of the basic values of emerging economy stocks moving 
together. Additionally, stock return co-movements are not explained either by economy 
and market characteristics (size, diversification, etc.) nor by direct measures of 
fundamentals co-movement (earnings co-movement across firms). Stocks falling and rising 
en masse are the matter of economies protecting private property rights. Thus, “economies 
that better protect private property rights have stock prices that move more independently” 
(Morck & Yeung, 2002, Abstract). 
 
The reasons for ups and downs are as follows: If investors expect a designated company to 
do well, informed investors push the price up by buying its stock. Whereas, if investors 
expect a company to perform poorly, informed investors push the price down by selling or 
shortening the company’s stock. 
A falling share price lead to the following problems: (1) expected lenders withhold capital, 
(2) shareholders force the board of directors to improve corporate governance, (3) the CEO 
is resigned by the board, (4) the board demands new strategies and (5) raiders launch 
takeovers by accumulating the heavily discounted stock. These effects trigger many 
mechanisms resulting in changes in the corporate governance. 
A rising share price, however, entails confidence in the company’s corporate governance 
by instilling confidence in the CEO and strategy and by rewarding the CEO with stock 
options that increase in value. 
 
In this sense, share price movements affect the capital allocation. Tobin (1982) defines the 
market as functionally efficient, if share price movements effect economically efficient 
capital allocation.  
However, how can the difference between emerging markets and developed markets be 
explained? Morck and Yeung (2002) find statements such as the clustering tendency in 
certain industries and the emerging economy being too affected by a couple of firms too 
superficial, because “large or diversified emerging economies do not have more 
independent stock prices than small or undiversified emerging economies” and in addition, 
“firm fundamentals, such as earning ratios, are only slightly more synchronous in 
emerging economies than in developed ones […]” (Morck & Yeung, 2002, p. 2).  
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Based on the stock price synchronicity that highly correlates with the measurement of 
private property rights protection, Morck and Yeung (2002) find that economies have more 
independent stock prices, when corruption is low. Thus, in economies where corrupt 
practices (arbitrageurs and noise traders) hardly exist, more independent stock price 
movements are in progress than in economies, where corruption is at the top of the agenda.  
 
Figure 5 shows the behaviour of US stock prices over the past decades. Additionally, in the 
1930s, the US stock returns are pointed out as being highly synchronous, rising and falling 
together. The synchronous stock movement is comparable to stocks in emerging markets 
nowadays. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Comovement in US Stocks from 1926 to 2000. Source: Morck, R., Yeung, B., 
2002, p. 25 
 
 
Furthermore, in economies where investors do perform information about individual 
companies and the quality of their corporate governance, firm-specific stock price 
movements calibrate the capital allocation. In economies, however, where investors do not 
provide information considering the companies’ tasks, “stock prices move together 
because of either economy-wide fundamentals or investor sentiments” (Morck & Yeung, 
2002, p. 3). In both cases, the quality of capital allocation is compromised. In accordance 
50 
 
with this, a higher quality of microeconomic capital allocation decision is shown in 
economies with more independent stock prices, which allow faster productivity growth. 
Consequently, Morck and Yeung (2002) prove that independent stock price movements are 
an indicator for a functionally efficient stock market.  
 
The market transparency is a big issue in emerging markets. It depends on how 
transparent and competitive those markets are and the ability to gain information for 
investors. Emerging markets are less transparent than developed markets and so, two 
indicators have been developed to pursue market transparency – the Opacity Index and the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
The Opacity Index is constructed to measure the transparency using dimensions for about 
thirty-five countries. The Opacity Index, also known as the ‘O-Factor’, which was 
constructed by PricewaterhouseCoopers, is composed of five dimensions as follows: 
corruption, legal, economics, accounting and regulatory, of course. The ‘O-Factor’ is the 
average of the index values on each dimension. The Corruption Perception Index, 
however, provides an annual index by ‘Transparency International’, to rank about 100 
countries on the level of perceived corruption. The most corruptive countries are settled in 
emerging markets – 18 countries. The 13 lowest corruption countries are in developed 
nations.  
 
In general, investors are concerned about a country’s market liquidity. In other words, 
they are concerned about the ease of capital movement. Developed markets allow more 
trading and so, the ability to make large trades in specific stocks without provoking big 
changes in stock prices. In contrast, emerging markets, however, vary in their liquidity 
creating tools to measure those irregularities.  
The first measurement tool are the turnover ratios, which are a percentage of the market. Li 
and Hoyer-Ellefsen (2008) define turnover ratios as the “ratio of value traded over one 
month to the total market capitalization” (p. 9). In addition to this, a high turnover ratio 
indicates a large number outstanding rates that were traded. Thus, large turnover ratios 
indicate a great liquidity and the larger and more developed countries achieve due to this 
fact higher turnover ratios. Furthermore, the second tool to measure market liquidity is the 
dollar value of traded shares. Shortly, this means to give all the money entering and 
leaving a market during a day some kind of value. The easiest way to do so is the value of 
money.  
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Almost all Latin American countries belong to the French civil law tradition. Guyana and 
Cuba, however, are deemed to be the exemptions; Guyana belongs to the English legal 
origin and Cuba to the socialist civil law tradition.  
The market in Brazil is open, but with some restrictions for foreign investors. Since May 
1991, foreign institutions are allowed to possess up to 49% of voting common stock and 
100% of nonvoting stocks. Furthermore, some corporate limitations do apply and the 
voting class of barks is not available. The Chilean market as well as the Peruvian market 
are 100% open. Since February 1, 1991, the market in Colombia is considered to be open 
too. At last but not least, stocks in Venezuela are considered to be 100% open. 
Therefore,  I am going to present you some characteristics of Latin American markets such 
as Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru and Venezuela.  
 
6.2 FIRM PERFORMANCE ORIENTED CHARACTERISTICS 
 
In this section I am going to clarify the firm performance of an corporation and take into 
consideration two groups of ownerships. The first group of owners is the family 
ownership, the second are business groups.  
Several authors believe that the costs of family ownerships are the capability to attain 
resources from other shareholders in the company and to employ incompetent family 
members to positions in the firm. Others advocate the family ownership because of its 
remarkable benefits such as long-tem commitment, stewardship of the firm and the 
monitoring function. Although recent studies examined the performance differences 
between family and non-family firms of US firms and evidence was found that benefits 
provided from family-owned companies outweigh their costs, there are still conflicting 
opinions of that group of ownership. 
Business groups and their effects, however, are a controversial topic too. A positive effect 
is the diversification of the group’s activities that lead to the foundation of internal markets 
when the existing markets are incomplete. This effect leads to numerous positive aspects 
concerning business groups. In contrast, such an accumulation of strong companies do 
have negative effects on minority shareholders and companies, that do not belong to such 
business groups.  
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According to what one sees, there are two sides of the same coin. Now, I am going to 
clarify the firm performance of both family ownership and business groups more detailed. 
 
6.2.1 Family ownership 
 
Martinez, Stöhr and Quiroga (2007, p. 87) define a ‘family-controlled firm’ as a company 
that falls into one of the following criteria:  
“1. A firm whose ownership is clearly controlled (electing over half the board 
members) by a family, where family members participate as members in the board 
of directors and/or top management. 
2. A firm whose ownership is clearly controlled (electing over half the board 
members) by a group of two to four families, where members of these families are 
also members of the board of directors. 
3. A firm that is included in a specific business group, as explicitly and 
unambiguously classified by the SVS3, and this group is clearly associated with a 
business family. 
4. A firm that is included in a specific business group, as explicitly and 
unambiguously classified by the SVS, and this group is clearly associated with an 
entrepreneur or businessperson who does not have any direct descendants, but has 
designated his or her family successors, and/or the market has internalized a 
continuity in time as an FCF through his or her nondirect descendants (i.e., 
siblings, cousins, nephews, nieces, or others)”. 
 
In general, good family-owned company practices differ from bad family-owned company 
practices in the degree on how effective corporate governance mechanisms actually limit 
family opportunism. Chile is a very good example to investigate the impact on 
performance because of Chile’s remarkable laboratory “to examine the importance of 
family influence in a setting with governance safeguards that differ from those of the 
United States and East-Asia” (Martinez et al., 2007, p. 83).  
Some additional negative effects of family ownerships or family businesses are that family 
members can pursue other goals than their minority shareholders and so are detrimental to 
                                                 
3
 Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (the Chilean Securities and Exchange Commission; SVS) – a 
Chilean governmental agency, which is in charge to 
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the economy. Furthermore, families could follow strategies to improve and participate firm 
growth, technological innovation or even firm survival instead of maximizing the 
shareholder value or maximizing profits. Martinez et al. (2007) find that other studies 
report that “family control leads to wealth expropriation in the presence of less than 
transparent financial markets” (p. 84). Another aspect of family-owned firms is that they 
favour to fill manager positions from the family which leads to competitive disadvantages 
compared to non-family corporations. At last but not least, the opinion is widespread that 
family ownership increases firm value when the founders of the firm serve as either CEOs 
or chairman of the family company. However, the firm value decreases when the 
descendents obtain one of the above positions. There is still a problem that family-owned 
companies are facing: the trust issue. Stock market participants do not trust that family 
firms will fairly share wealth with other shareholders in the firm. This is a reason, why 
such shareholders more heavily discount family firm’s shares, although family share are 
much more profitable. So, these companies ruled by family owners are punished with 
discounts in stock market prices for their liquidity and low market presence due to their 
high ownership concentration. 
As mentioned before, there are two sides of the same coin. There are positive effects about 
family ownerships too, of course. There is evidence indicated by many scholars, that 
family ownership leads to a higher firm performance. This happens because of the 
following findings. Owners of a family business do have high incentives to monitor 
managers thus reducing agency problems and maximizing firm value. Furthermore, the 
difference between family ownership and non-family firms is that families do have longer 
investment perspectives than other shareholders and so harvest long-term profits. Another 
important aspect is that families invest more efficiently with their hidden agenda to pass 
the firm onto succeeding generations. However, is there an effect of family-owned 
companies on firm performance? Yes, there are positive effects. Evidence shows that two 
arguments against family ownership are destroyed: First of all, that family business have a 
negative influence on firm performance and second, that minority shareholders are 
unfavourably affected by family ownership. 
 
To answer the question “why do family-controlled firms that are listed on the stock market 
perform better than non-family firms?”, we have to clarify the advantages and 
disadvantages of such companies. Martinez et al. (2007) summarized that:  
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“Among these advantages or strengths we can identify a closer monitoring, an 
essential long-run perspective, higher unity of goals among shareholders, quicker 
decision making, stronger culture that come from family values […]. On the other 
side, some of those weaknesses or disadvantages are related to the overlap of 
family and business issues, lack of succession planning, nepotism, resistance to 
change and to professionalization, agency issues […]” (p. 85). 
However, most of the above mentioned disadvantages and weaknesses are the reason for 
the lack of accountability, effectiveness and professionalization of management as well as 
market pressure. 
 
Now the question arises, why Chile is actually a very good example to investigate the 
impact on performance. I mentioned Chile’s remarkable laboratory correctly, but it is not 
the only reason. Chile enjoys many privileges in Latin America. It’s high diversity of 
natural gases and important public policies that aim stability are several reasons. 
Furthermore, although Chile has a relatively small economy, it is a very trade-dependent 
nation and more opened and developed than most developed countries, though being an 
emerging market. The Chilean stock market is well developed and do attract al kinds of 
investments. Hence, the trading volume of stocks as a percentage of GDP is one of the 
highest in Latin America. At last but not least, Chile has a high mobility of capital flows in 
and outside the country and the Chilean Private Pension System is very successful and 
recognized worldwide. 
Due to this, it is worth to mention that family-owned companies dominate almost every 
sector: “forestry; fishing; manufacturing of food and beverages; textile and apparel; metal 
products, machinery, and equipment; retail trade; restaurants and hotels; and transport 
and storage” (Martinez et al., 2007, p. 89). On the other hand, family businesses are lower 
presented in water works and supply as well as communications and basic metal industries. 
 
Summarized, family-controlled firms do have a better performance than non-family 
controlled firms. If family-controlled companies improve their management skills and 
governance bodies, start to feel the pressure of market control and are accountable to 
minority shareholders, they will overcome the majority of their traditional weaknesses and 
take advantage of their strengths to succeed. 
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6.2.2 Business groups 
 
In Chile, business groups are defined by Security Law No. 18,045 as: 
“collection of legal entities which share ownership, administration, or credit 
responsibility ties of such a nature that there is ground to believe that their 
economic and financial behaviour is guided by common interests, or that their 
financial risks of debt and equity are interconnected”. 
This means that two or more corporations are in the same business group if they have a 
shared administration in the conglomerates and their integration in the financial sector as 
well as a family-ownership-relationship. Furthermore, business groups differ from loose 
corporations by financial ties and a good social structure.  
 
As with family-owned corporations, business groups do have some positive as well as 
negative effects on performance too.  
Effects are expected to be positive when the dispersion of the business group’s activities 
leads to internal markets. This mechanism makes up for deficiencies in the operation of 
typically less developed markets by improving efficiency and the economic of scope. 
There are three reasons facing that statement. First of all, business ties reduce transaction 
costs by enabling coordinated actions. Second, “corporate  diversification facilitates the 
transfer of resources to divisions with better opportunities, in particular when common 
knowledge about the organization exists” (Silva, Majluf, and Paredes, 2005, p. 315). At 
last but not least, there is a reason why business groups are large and diversified in 
emerging markets. Many institutions actually do not exist or just work poorly and so, it is 
very difficult to implement new technologies, to finance cheap or to obtain high-toned 
management knowledge. Those factors are the reason for contributing a positive 
performance in developing economies. 
However, there are negative effects on performance too, if business groups take advantage 
to dispossess their minority shareholders at the cost of efficiency. Minority shareholders, 
for example, may use transfer prices “by exploiting relationships with other companies 
they control, by transferring assets to themselves at values below the prevailing market 
prices, by getting private loans using the firm’s assets as collateral, or by paying special 
dividends to themselves” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
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Now I am going to discuss the performance which is affected by exactly two dimensions 
related to corporate governance to understand their tasks, procedures and importance in 
Chile, an emerging market. The first dimension is the ownership-control structure of the 
business group which is characterized by the economic rights and voting rights of the 
controlling shareholders. The second, are the social ties of the firm within the business 
group containing interlocking directors and family ties of controlling shareholders in the 
board of directors. These two dimensions are important effects on performance. 
The ownership concentration is measured as the part of the company that is owned by the 
board of directors. A high ownership concentration will support the firm if it decreases the 
incentives to take out private benefits for the controlling shareholders. Additionally, the 
firm will be supported too, if short-term projects are not favoured over long-term projects 
any more.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that there is a relation between the ownership concentration 
and the market value that both are significant on a business group’s performance. Now, it 
is important to discuss the economic rights and voting rights. Economic rights are rights to 
have at command cash flows and dividends of the company, whereas voting rights “refer 
to the percentage of votes in the hands of the controlling shareholder for the nomination of 
board members” (Silva et al., 2005, p. 316).  
Both are linked to the ownership structure, because of their impacts. However, those 
impacts on performance have different outcomes in different categories. There are three 
categories of economic rights: low, medium and high. Silva et al. (2005) find that:  
“At low concentrations of economic rights value creation dominates value 
expropriation., probably because monitoring by other shareholders is closer and 
more effective. At medium concentrations, the controlling shareholder are 
progressively less monitored by the market, making expropriation more likely. 
Finally, at high concentrations, the incentives for the controlling shareholders to 
extract private benefits decrease, because these shareholders largely bear the costs 
of their actions themselves” (p. 319).  
When voting rights of controlling shareholders are higher than their economic rights, it is 
common that those shareholders do have incentives to take out or transfer value away from 
the firm. This is a common procedure in business groups. Furthermore, business groups are 
able to maintain voting rights in a surplus of economic rights by having cross-ownerships 
and holding a number of different stocks, but also by building a pyramidal ownership 
structure, for example. It is important to consider the gap that arises between voting rights 
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and economic rights. A large gap indicates “a higher risk of expropriation by the 
controlling shareholders, and consequently, a lower value of the firm against the industry” 
(Silva et al., 2005, p. 316). Finally, voting rights do have similar results considering a 
business group’s performance, but are less solid.  
 
To finalize the investigation on performance, I am going to present you the last dimension 
that has an impact on performance – social ties, represented by the interlocking directors 
and family ties. There is evidence that including more family members and economic 
rights into companies do have a positive impact on performance. However, performance is 
reduced when there are too many voting rights in a business group. Numerically, when 
economic rights do not change and voting rights increase up to 90 percent, performance 
decreases with family ties. In turn, when voting rights do not change and economic rights 
increase up to 67 percent, there is an even stronger positive impact on performance 
considering family ties. 
 
Summarized, the effects of business groups on firm performance depend not only on the 
corporate governance, but on the firm consolidation too. As mentioned before, there is a 
relation between ownership concentration (economic and voting rights) and social ties 
(interlocking directors and family ties).  
First of all, an increase in social ties do not have to lead to an increase in performance 
regarding on voting rights. Low voting rights indicate an increase in performance because 
of better coordination and thus monitoring function by relevant shareholders. Furthermore, 
increasing economic rights strengthen these positive impacts because of reduced 
expropriation incentives that are linked to the costs of expropriation by the controlling 
shareholders. Then, social ties decrease performance when voting rights are high. The 
reason is, that expropriation is then being favoured.   
Second, social ties do effect, as mentioned before, different factors in a different way. 
Family ties have a positive impact on the majority of business groups, representing about 
76 percent of the companies, in Chile. In contrast, for interlocking directors, the opposite is 
true. They do improve performance in only 26 percent of the cases. Furthermore, family 
ties in general do enhance efficiency in firms belonging to business groups, because of 
better communication, trust and coordination. Nonetheless, some Chilean boards of 
directors seem to exist to fulfil legal requirements only, instead of managing their 
companies efficiently.  
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7 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EMERGING MARKETS 
 
To understand the close link between the restrictions of corporate governance and the 
entity of emerging markets, some important factors have to be mentioned. However, the 
following question occurs: Do pressures of capital markets will improve the governance of 
corporations and will those changes promote the development of capital markets? We have 
to recognize that this chain of reactions do matter on a couple of important factors, as 
mentioned above. So, what does matter? Legal rules, legal families, political structures and 
history are several of those factors. With these “mechanisms” it is possible to measure the 
effectiveness of the function of legal rules and the functionality of capital markets by 
comparing the efficiency of corporate governance in emerging markets. We should keep in 
mind, that legal rules are “the product of and dependent on political action” (Jordan and 
Lubrano, 2007, p. 3). Additionally, it is still difficult to analyze the consequences of the 
intensity of the activity on how capital markets as well as financial systems grow and 
develop!  
 
In the previous section we have discussed some problems emerging markets are facing and 
so, researchers do ask in these globalizing times, if one or another corporate governance 
system – when implemented - possess the “mechanisms” to gain a competitive advantage 
compared to the ‘old’ governance system in emerging markets. Or, can one system be 
transplanted into the other? The answer is, that the manner of transplantation is significant. 
An important predictor of effectiveness is the extent to which a foreign legal system has 
been introduced. An important factor is, however, the promotion of international standards 
in both capital markets and corporate governance which is an important indicator of 
convergence of legal rules. International standards proved themselves in the past and so, 
“gauging the effectiveness of convergence to these standards becomes a more complex 
matter” (Jordan and Lubrano, 2007, p. 3).  
Before presenting you the answers to the question, ‘what could work?’, I have to mention 
following: When adopting foreign standards in an emerging country, we have to take into 
account the target country’s legal system. Finally, I am going to present you several 
general observations from Jordan and Lubrano (2007) that can be made about the 
importance of private and public legal rules to promote the development of capital markets 
and enhance the governance processes of corporations.  
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7.1 PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LEGAL RULES 
 
At first Jordan and Lubrana (2007, p. 25) find out that “Private legal rules are important”. 
Over the past several years, the debate about the regulation of capital markets and the 
corporate governance find their origin in the Anglo-American law. So, this debate is more 
an Anglo-American one. Particularly in the USA, a contractual governance mechanism 
arises because of the development of fairly standardized private legal rules that balances 
and protects future market participants while providing an exit from contracts by 
undesirable courts. 
In the Latin American case, however, three important aspects are faced considering the 
contractual governance mechanisms. At first, private legal rules, also known as contracts, 
are important anyways – protecting economic interests and rights. Then, contracts generate 
market-tested solutions and finally, private legal rules can migrate back to the private 
sector in search of a more effective form of implementation. 
  
Then, they realized that “Different legal traditions have different balances in terms of the 
effectiveness of private or public legal rules” (Jordan and Lubrana, 2007, p. 25). Even in 
the Anglo-American governance mechanism, there are significant differences in the 
tradition, namely the English tradition and the American. History shows that because of the 
American Revolution, the American common law has greater affinities with continental 
European tradition than with English common law.  
In English common law, the importance of judicial action dominates statutory/written law 
ex ante public legal rules). Furthermore, the English common law has an aversion to law as 
legislation (ex ante public legal rules). In some cases, however, there are no judge-made 
rules (public legal rules) at all. Furthermore, England has parliamentary conventions and 
no written constitution. Those parliamentary conventions are practices and principles being 
developed on a consensual basis for ages. 
The American common law has no aversion using legislation (ex ante public legal rules). 
Therefore, the American law’s proclivities are similar with continental European legal 
traditions. This is the reason why the US have uniform commercial codes such as a 
bankruptcy or federal code for example. 
The continental European tradition is the basis for the legal systems of the non-
Commonwealth world (English common law). A characteristic of the continental European 
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law tradition is the importance of written law (ex ante public legal rules) and the hierarchy 
of law (constitution, code, statute, regulation). 
 
Furthermore, Jordan and Lubrana, 2007 find that “A predictor of effectiveness of any 
particular governance mechanism may be its form (private, public, or semi-public legal 
rule) and the legal tradition in which it operates” (p. 26). It is important to understand 
that the same government mechanism may take different forms and that the form in which 
it will be implemented and most efficient will be determined by the legal system in which 
it operates. 
Additionally, Jordan and Lubrana (2007) indicate that there are three examples of the most 
popular corporate governance mechanisms that are not able to be transplanted to another 
legal system because of being an appropriate form of rule. Voluntary Codes of corporate 
governance are the first malfunctioning mechanisms. Flexibility, responsiveness and 
sensitivity to industry-specific concerns as wells as considerations are some important 
factors why voluntary codes are favoured. Furthermore, the aversions to written law (ex 
ante public legal rules) are forcing British governance systems to favour voluntary codes of 
corporate governance. The reason why those codes cannot be transplanted into most 
foreign governance systems is the result from the unsuccessful attempt to implement a 
voluntary code into an continental European corporate governance system which cannot 
recognize the concept used in the target country. The second malfunctioning mechanisms 
are the voluntary codes and institutional markets where the capital markets of the target 
country ironically have an uncommon effect on governance systems. Furthermore, the 
international capital market has been so dominated in the last decades by Anglo-American 
law and practices that the spillover into local laws and practices was unavoidable. As you 
might imagine, some of those spillovers were ineffective as well as inefficient because of 
incompatible underlying legal systems or contradict provisions in the civil or commercial 
code. However, one problem is faced as being devious. As long as there is little interest in 
international capital markets, there will be still interest to introduce a domestically 
malfunctioning, but internationally recognized corporate governance system! At last but 
not least, cumulative voting and class actions are the last of the most popular corporate 
governance mechanisms that are not able to be transplanted to another legal system. 
Cumulative voting and class action mechanisms were introduced only because of the 
popularity of voluntary codes. Both are originated from the US to enhance minority 
shareholder representation on boards and to promote management accountability. Both 
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mechanisms were implemented for public investors to be able to influence the corporate 
governance of firms. Again, both mechanisms signal the interest on international capital 
markets and so, the American debate on corporate governance started. 
 
Further on, another observation can be made about the importance of private and public 
legal rules to promote the development of capital markets and enhance the governance 
processes of corporations. Jordan and Lubrana (2007) find that “Public policymakers 
should anticipate, and encourage, private and quasi-public legal rules that complement 
and reinforce public legal rules of corporate governance” (p. 31). They indicate that the 
relationship between private legal rules and public legal rules are linked together. There is 
evidence, that when effort is being put to improve governance systems of corporations in 
emerging markets, there are simultaneously initiatives in the public and private sector 
spheres. The Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance, for example, developed a 
voluntary code of best practices and an active training program for companies and 
corporate directors to be able to deal with the growing activity at the public legislative 
level successfully. 
 
“The optimal content and mix of mechanisms in any market will depend on a variety of 
factors. Some of the most effective mechanisms may be found in these intermediate  
forms-semi- or quasi-public legal rules- enforceable by private means” (Jordan and 
Lubrana, 2007, p. 33). There are four key market characteristics for emerging markets to 
be able to implement a foreign corporate governance system. The first one is the relative 
adequacy of existing practices. This means that before implementing a new governance 
system, emerging markets should be investigated if there are, for example, too many non-
voting shares, uncertain rules for protecting minority shareholders or if there is poor 
quality of audits or even conflicting managers, boards as well as investors and regulators. 
Then, there should be a focus on the number, size, and industry of public issuers. 
Hereby, financial markets should question if the relationship and atmosphere between 
controlling shareholders and corporate executives is too calm or too aggressive towards 
traditions, political views and co-operation. Furthermore, the number, size and nature of 
principal investor groups – institutional, pension and international – should consider the 
quality of investors being governed. Additionally, contortions appertaining to the 
investors’ incentives of interest such as profit-maximizing should be questioned too. 
Finally, resources of the enforcement mechanisms such as courts, regulators and existing 
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alternative dispute resolutions should be considered. Hereby, the following question arises: 
What enforcement agents are able to notice already performed contracts, are able to 
observe standards and regulations? Answering this question will help to understand key 
market characteristics of emerging markets. 
 
Now, I will present you shortly some key characteristics of Latin America that are relevant 
to the problems this market is facing. The ownership structure of Latin America is similar 
to other countries in other markets in continental Europe and East Asia, for example. Those 
countries, as well as Latin America, have a high equity concentration and very complex 
business group structures in several forms – pyramids, cross-shareholding, rings etc. Those 
structures allow “controlling shareholders to leverage their voting power though business 
group affiliation and to deviate from the one-share-one-vote rule” (Gutierrez & Pombo, 
2009, p. 115). Additionally, there are three mechanisms that imply deviation from this 
statement. At first, the publishing of non-voting shares, then the dual shares and at last, the 
dividend-preferred share. However, the issuance of dual shares are forbidden by corporate 
law in most Latin American countries. Other countries, such as Chile for example, restrict 
cross-shareholdings and “impose a cap on the issue of preferred stocks relative to shares 
outstanding” (Gutierrez & Pombo, 2009, p. 115). 
 
The corporate governance faces many problems and opponents but also proponents in 
emerging markets. Due to scandals in Chile, Mexico as well as Brazil and Argentine, also 
in emerging markets reforms are on the to-do-list. Jordan and Lubrano (2007) described 
the problems of some investors in Brazilian and Argentine companies that “were forced to 
accept low-ball offers from controlling shareholders who had decided to delist the 
companies” (p. 9). Hence, the majority of Brazilian shareholders felt themselves treated 
unfairly because of being excluded of transactions in which holding the majority of voting 
shares sold control of the company.  
We already know that capital market participants do have private initiatives in the area of 
corporate governance that are often simultaneously following the amendment of the legal 
framework. So, problems occur for those companies, that have proven track records in the 
market or have dominant positions in the equity indexes. Additionally, the following 
question arises with justification: Why do such companies have to disclose additional 
information to shareholders or to allow outsiders onto their boards?  
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During the debates over reforms, many corporations in Latin America were never thinking 
of public security markets as a source for capital. In contrast, many of those companies 
started to sell control to larger national as well as international competitors and thus were 
indifferent to the prices at which their securities were traded.  
So, in the end, the executives and legislatures of the Latin American countries approved a 
mild version of the proposed reforms. Chile’s reformers were the most successful. 
However, even in Chile, “majority shareholders were permitted to suspend application of 
the law’s mandatory tender-offer provision for three years” (Jordan & Lubrano, 2007, p. 
10). In Mexico, however, reforms do not anticipate the desired triumph. “Mexico’s 
legislation (probably unwisely) delegated authority for setting the parameters of the 
mandatory tender-offer rule to the banking and securities regulator, which has so far 
proven unable to issue the required regulation” (Jordan & Lubrano, 2007, p. 10). 
 
These circumstances lead to impacts in the long-term and short-term. The promoters of 
reforms in corporate governance in emerging markets wanted to mandate greater 
transparency, to provide shareholders securities and to reinforce judicial enforcement, with 
an positive effect on capital market development. There are some important long-term 
effects such as the access to new capital, gaining new offerings, security prices as well as 
liquidity and an improvement in corporate performance. In the short-run, it is still difficult 
to conclude whether those changes do have a positive short-term impact or not. However, 
reforms succeeded in focusing on directors, managers and companies as well as 
institutional investors. The public was informed about the urgent changes in corporate 
governance, especially in emerging markets. 
 
In the next sections, I am going to engross the thoughts of corporate ownership and control 
in Latin America and present some reasons for a high ownership and control concentration 
in most emerging markets, especially in Brazil. Additionally, I am going to indicate the 
effects of the relationship between the corporate governance structure and market valuation 
and present you the problems when ownership and control will be separated. 
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8 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL 
 
 
Brazil’s first Corporation law was adopted in 1940 and the government started to run the 
stock exchanges. The tasks of brokers were fulfilled by civil servants who were allowed to 
trade shares on the exchanges and some government rules regulated the brokerage fees and 
the number of brokers in each area.  
In 1964, after the military coup, some financial liberalizations started. Twelve years later, 
in 1976, the first law to regulate markets and security offerings was adopted by the new 
government. In the very same year, the Brazilian securities commission - Comissao de 
Valores Mobiliarios, short CVM – and a new Corporation Law were founded. The latter 
established separate rules for public and closely held corporations. Due to these reforms, 
private stock exchanges and broker-dealers emerged and the old servant brokers were 
eliminated. 
The Brazilian government started to encourage the stock market development during the 
1970s and 1980s by granting tax incentives to firms which went public and to investors 
who purchased shares in public companies. Furthermore, pension funds and insurance 
companies were required to invest a minimum of their assets in shares of public 
companies. During the 1980s, almost 600 publicly held companies arose. However, most 
of these companies went public to gain the advantages of taxation and not because of the 
interest of trading their shares actively or having public shareholders. 
By the end of the 1980s, most of the companies that went public because of tax incentives 
returned to private ownership. At the same time, the government privatized a large number 
of state-owned companies. Furthermore, in the late 1990s, share trading with shares of 
privatized companies was common and many Brazilian companies cross-listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Hence, the majority of trading moved to the NYSE and the 
number of public firms decreased. 
In the meantime, in the 1980s, the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange, Bovespa, was designated to 
be the share trading market, after the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange collapsed. The 
remaining exchanges proceeded to Bovespa in 2000. In 1995, the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Governanca Corporativa, the Brazilian Institute for Corporate Governance or IBCG, was 
founded and released an initial Code on the Best Practices of Corporate Governance in 
1999. Santana (2007) determines that three new listing segments were launched by 
Bovespa in 2000 – level 1, level 2 and Novo Mercado. Furthermore, he finds that these 
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listings contain stronger requirements than for a regular Bovespa listing. Additionally, in 
2002, CVM issued its own Recommendations on Corporate Governance, which, however, 
are recommendations only and do not follow the ““comply or explain” regime, in contrast 
to a number of other countries” (Black, de Carvalho & Gorga, 2008, p. 4). 
 
The listing levels, more precisely the Bovespa and Cross-listings, are analyzed in the next 
section. 
 
8.1 LISTING LEVELS 
 
Gorga (2006) examines the regulations in the Brazilian financial markets and finds that 
they are heavily regulated.  
 
However, Brazil’s image of having a poor corporate governance was the reason for 
Bovespa to create listing levels with strict corporate governance requirements. Black, de 
Carvalho and Gorga (2008) find that “The higher levels provided investors with a readily 
understood signal of their corporate governance posture” (p. 7). The Bovespa listing 
levels became successful and now include the ‘regular’ Bovespa, Level 1, Level 2 and 
Novo Mercado. 
It is important to realize that both common shares and nonvoting preferred shares are 
issued by many Brazilian companies. These shares are similar considering their economic 
rights to nonvoting common shares.  
A Novo Mercado listing requires the following features:  
“the firm issue only voting common shares; have a minimum free float (shares not 
controlled by the controlling shareholder) of 25%; provide financial statements 
which comply with U.S. GAAP or IAS; provide full takeout rights to minority 
shareholders in a transfer of control; and agree that conflicts with shareholders 
will be resolved by arbitration” (Black, de Carvalho & Gorga, 2008, p. 7). 
A level 2 listing is similar to Novo Mercado with the difference, that companies are 
allowed to issue preferred shares. The level 1 listing, however, focuses on improved 
disclosures and is almost an ordinary listing. Furthermore, new listings have to be at least 
on a level 1 listing or higher. Foreign companies, however, that want to cross-list on 
Bovespa, are the only exception.  
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Four years ago, in 2006, Bovespa Mais was founded by Bovespa, with the intend to help 
smaller companies with lower listing requirements than Novo Mercado. 
 
Cross-listing are another way to provide Brazilian companies “to signal their intend to 
maintain a higher level of disclosure and other corporate governance practices” (Black, 
de Carvalho & Gorga, 2008, p. 7).  
 
8.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2008) provide an extensive survey of Brazilian corporate 
governance in 2005. Overall, they received 116 replies from privately controlled 
companies, government-controlled companies and subsidiaries of foreign companies, 
respectively, 88, 17 and 11 replies. 
In their sample of 116 companies, 9 have cross-listed their shares, most of them with the 
intend to gain nonvoting preferred shares. Only 3 companies are listed on Bovespa Level 2 
and 2 firms are listed on Novo Mercado.  
Furthermore, Black, de Carvalho and Gorga (2008, p. 8) provide a short overview of cross-
listing and Bovespa listing as follows: 
“From 1995-2003, there were only six initial public offerings by Brazilian firms 
[…]. The number of IPOs then soared to 7 in 2004; 9 in 2005, 26 in 2006, and 64 
in 2007. Of these 106 IPOs, 75 were on Novo Mercado, 15 on Level 2, 8 on Level 
1, and 8 (all cross-listed firms) had a regular listing. […]. In addition, 16 older 
firms have upgraded their governance to meet the Level 2 or Novo Mercado 
requirements. Only 4 of the newly public firms were cross-listed in the U.S. on level 
2 or 3 (all level 2 listings on the NYSE).. Another 23 of these firms have cross-listed 
in the U.S. on level 4 (Rule 144A) and 2 firms have cross-listed on level 1”. 
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9 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN BRAZIL 
 
 
In the 1980s, corporate governance models were examined to evaluate their effectiveness 
in the valuation and dividend policy of corporations in emerging markets. In Brazil, for 
example, important factors have stimulated efforts to consider a better corporate 
governance system. Such factors are the opening market process, privatizations and new 
foreign investors, especially foreign institutions. 
Most studies focused on the corporate ownership and control structure. The ownership 
structure contains the cash flow rights, whereas the control structure contains the voting 
rights. There is evidence that the ownership structure in combination with the country legal 
protection, is one of the most important determinants of corporate governance. 
 
Such as in Brazil, corporate ownership and control is highly concentrated in Colombia. 
Most of the business groups and conglomerates nowadays, started their corporations as 
family businesses and became corporate groups later.  
Additionally, it is worth to mention that there are four facts regarding corporate ownership 
and control which are important to understand. First of all, corporate ownership is highly 
concentrated. The top four largest shareholders in Colombia indicate that they hold more 
than “51 percent of a firm’s cash flow rights […]. Under one-vote-one-share rule this 
provides a private control to the largest shareholders” (Gutierrez & Pombo, 2007, p. 10). 
Consequently, the largest voting blocks of affiliated companies belong to the same 
business groups. Then, it is essential to know that ownership concentration has 
increased. On average, more than 80 percent of cash flow rights were held by the four 
largest shareholders in about 45 percent of the evaluated companies in 2002. By way of 
comparison, this number was about 32 percent in 1996. The third fact indicates a low 
separation ratio within the largest voting block which was recognized at “the top-four 
voting blocks and at ultimate owner levels” (Gutierrez & Pombo, 2007, p. 11). Finally, 
investment corporations play a central role as controlling shareholders. 
 
Now, I am going to investigate the ownership and control structure more detailed and 
present you some problems, when ownership and control will be separated. 
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9.1 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE VS. CONTROL STRUCTURE 
 
The ownership structure in combination with the cash flow rights is an important 
corporate governance mechanism in emerging markets because it influences the efficiency 
of the market for corporate control directly. However, an agency problem may occur 
between managers and shareholders because managers may have not in mind to maximize 
shareholder’s value in the first place. The agency problem will be discussed in section 9.3.  
Furthermore, the ownership has two main categories - the identity of the large owner and 
the concentration of ownership. Due to this, there are owners such as institutional 
investors, government, family and foreigners of a corporation according to the point of 
origin of capital. 
 
We already know that the corporate governance do have effects on the market liquidity, 
firm value and the organization of markets as well as organizations in a context of weak 
shareholder protection. Furthermore, the ownership structures provide a large environment 
to do research in a regional setting such as in Latin America. So, it is important to keep in 
mind, that in markets with a weak protection for minority shareholders, but a large 
ownership concentration, “market participants impose a discount on the value of firms in 
which the voting rights of dominant shareholders exceed the cash-flow rights” (Cueto, 
2008, p. 2). Additionally, the dominant shareholders’ close collaboration assume 
managerial functions, but instead, the firm’s management is monitored by them. 
Furthermore, the ownership concentration of publicly held companies is widely dispersed 
among investors. This circumstance is not common in countries in which families, business 
groups and/or governments control most of the publicly traded firms. Compared to the 
USA, controlling shareholders govern many firms too, so it is a common phenomena. 
However, due to the concentrated ownership structure, a new conflict of interest is arising. 
This problem of interest arises between minority shareholders and dominant shareholders. 
Cueto (2008) notices exactly, that this conflict “is characterized as the potential for asset 
diversion from the firms to dominant shareholders, reducing overall shareholder’s value” 
(p. 2).  
Additionally, the gap between voting and cash flow rights is created and intensified by 
three mechanisms. The first is the aggregation of voting rights by business groups, then the 
use of multiple class shares and finally, the indirect ownership through pyramidal 
structures. In the latter mechanism, top companies are equipped with disproportional 
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voting rights over cash flows generated firms at the base. To bring up the asset diversion, it 
is included from the base up. 
 
The control structure in combination with the voting rights do investigate, to whom the 
company finally belongs. Gutierrez and Pombo (2009) define voting rights as “the total 
votes that a shareholder is entitled to on the basis of direct investment in a firm and 
indirect ownership” (p. 115).  
Important is a direct correspondence between voting rights and cash flow rights for each 
shareholder. To obtain this result, shareholders according to the level of voting rights have 
to be aggregated. Furthermore, the aggregation of voting rights may stabilize the position 
of dominant shareholders. Cueto (2008) assigns “any treasury stocks’ voting rights and 
cash-flow rights to dominant shareholders” (p. 7). Another important statement from 
Cueto (2008) is that “cash-flow rights of voting shareholders are diluted, with respect to 
the simple percentage of voting shares, as cash-flow rights of other non-voting 
shareholders are taking into account” (p. 7). A wider discrepancy of voting rights and 
cash flow rights would be the consequence of not collecting voting and non-voting shares 
across members of a business group. 
 
9.2 DIRECT STRUCTURE OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL VS. INDIRECT 
STRUCTURE OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
 
 
To study the link between the ownership and control structure more detailed, we have to 
analyze two forms of shareholding composition; the direct and indirect ownership. Direct 
shareholders are those who own shares in the company itself and indirect shareholders are 
stockholders who actually own the company. 
 
9.2.1 Shareholder composition 
 
The direct structure of ownership and control considering the shareholder composition 
indicates, that about 90 percent of companies in Brazil have one shareholder that owns 
more than 50 percent of the voting capital. To put it in another way, this single shareholder 
owns on average about 76 percent of the voting capital. This situation demonstrates that 
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when one single shareholder does not possess the majority of votes, the largest shareholder 
have a respectable amount of them. Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal (2003) find that “the 
largest, the 3 largest and the 5 largest shareholders have, respectively, 72%, 85% and 
87% of the voting capital” (p. 7) - indicating a high concentration of the voting capital.  
Furthermore, there is a noticeable difference between the percentage of voting and total 
capital held by large shareholders. In Brazil, large shareholders use the issuance of non-
voting shares to gain control of the company without having to possess 50 percent of the 
total capital. Additionally, an investor that is at the same moment a single shareholder, 
holds on average 76 percent of the voted, but only 54 percent of the total capital. 
“In Brazil companies are allowed to issue shares without voting rights in an amount up to 
two-thirds of the total capital” (Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal, 2003, p. 7). However, the 
New Law of Corporations (Law 10303) changed the maximum amount of non-voting 
shares, which is obligatory to non-public companies that indent to go public after October 
2001 and for new corporations. The maximum amount of non-voting shares changed from 
two-third to 50 percent. This mechanism allows companies to issue shares without giving 
up control. Furthermore, it is also a way to separate ownership from control. 
 
The indirect structure of ownership and control considering the shareholder 
composition indicates the indirect interest of shareholders. The difference between the 
direct and the indirect structure of ownership and control considering the major 
shareholder holding more than 50 percent of the voting capital is, that the indirect 
ownership is more diluted. The following example shows the difference numerically. The 
average majority shareholder owns about 76 percent of voting capital and 54 percent of the 
total capital in the direct form of ownership and control. Indirectly, the majority 
shareholder owns 69 percent of the voting capital and 40 percent of the total capital.  
 
 
9.2.2 Market valuation and dividend payout 
 
The market valuation and dividend payout considering the direct structure of ownership 
and control is measured according to the identity of the controlling shareholder. 
Foreigners, the government and families as well as institutional investors class among 
controlling shareholders.  
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The direct structure of ownership and control indicate that a higher concentration of voting 
rights is associated with a lower firm valuation. Due to this, there is evidence that there is a 
negative relationship between control concentration and market valuation. Furthermore, 
evidence shows that companies controlled by the government are undervalued when being 
compared to family controlled corporations. 
 
The market valuation and dividend payout considering the indirect structure of 
ownership and control states that the higher the concentration of cash flow rights, the 
higher is the firm valuation. Furthermore, evidence shows that the higher the voting/total 
capital ratio is, the lower is the firm valuation. 
 
9.2.3 Effects of ownership and control on the market valuation 
 
The direct structure of ownership and control considering the market value indicate that 
“companies wit a foreign or institutional controlling shareholder tend to present a higher 
valuation, when compared to family-owned companies, while government-owned firms 
tend to have the lowest valuation” (Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal, 2003, p. 11). An 
explanation can be that governance is more complex in government-owned companies and 
so, the control rights are in the government’s hands. These control rights are dissociated 
from the cash flow rights, because of the ownership of the company that belongs to the 
citizens. 
 
The indirect structure of ownership and control considering the market value are the 
same as in the direct structure.  
 
 
9.2.4 Effects of ownership and control on the dividend payout 
 
The effects of the direct ownership and control on the dividend payout state, that 
companies with a high concentration of voting rights have a low payout, where as firms 
with a high concentration of cash flow rights have a high payout. Furthermore, evidence 
shows that corporations do have a low payout when separation between voting and cash 
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flow rights is high. Consequently, family-owned firms do have a lower payout when 
compared to government-owned corporation, that have the highest payout.  
 
The indirect ownership and control do have the same effects on the dividend payout such 
as the direct structure. 
 
 
9.3 SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
 
Researchers have the problem now, when trying to separate the ownership and control, if it 
will be realizable in the first place and if it will lead to significant improvements of the 
corporate governance in the second place. 
Berle and Means (1932) made remarkable progress in their survey of the differences 
between ownership and control by estimating the separation of ownership and control 
among the 200 largest American corporations. They figured out that:  
“Since direction over the activities of a corporation is exercised through the board 
of directors, we may say for practical purposes that control lies in the hands of the 
individual or group who have the actual power to select the board of directors (or 
its majority), either by mobilizing the legal right to choose them – ‘controlling’ a 
majority of the votes directly or through some legal device – or by exerting 
pressure which influences their choice” (Berle and Means, 1932, p. 69). 
 
To be able to measure the different separation levels, voting rights have to be measured 
under the portfolio view. The portfolio view is based on the concept of a shareholder’s 
integrated direct as well as indirect ownership concentration, while the direct ownership is 
related to cash flows. Considering the control structure issue, the former provides indirect 
votes and the latter direct votes. Hence, different separation levels can be defined and 
concentration ratios are measurable. Gutierrez and Pombo (2007) applied such an 
measurement to 108 stock trading firms and find that the separation levels are low. This 
result implies that firm control is practised through direct ownership and so, corporate 
structure follows a strong owner management direction. Hence, “owners command and 
control boards and appoint CEOs” (Gutierrez & Pombo, 2007, p. 17). Furthermore, they 
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find that the concentration of voting is much stronger in sectors such as construction, 
manufacturing and health as well as personal services.  
Gutierrez and Pombo (2007) have very interesting evidence concerning the separation 
ratios as follows.  
Controlling shareholders have about 32 percent of cash flow rights and about 34 percent of 
voting rights. In 1996, ultimate owners were represented with 68 percent in corporations 
compared to 2002, the ultimate owners represented an remarkable increased to 86 percent. 
This happened because widely held companies decreased their participation as ultimate 
owners. Furthermore, in Colombia, investment companies do have an important role as 
controlling shareholders as well as for the whole business group, where families are the 
owners of investment firms and trust fund contracts. However, regulations prohibit banks 
to have direct shares in real sector companies and so, banks are participating through 
subsidiary firms as trust funds, investment banks and insurance companies. Hence, less 
than 9 percent of the controlling owners are represented by financial institutions. 
 
Summarized, the separation of cash flow rights to voting rights ratios are low and the 
separation decreases slightly. This is a strong evidence that corporate control is privately-
owned. Furthermore, “the composition of ultimate owners shows that investment firms play 
a strategic role as a controlling shareholder” and that family ties are the main source of 
ultimate owners (Gutierrez & Pombo, 2007, p. 40). Additionally, it is important to point 
out that the cash flow rights are positively related with a firm’s better valuation and 
performance. Further on, the separation between the ownership and control structure has a 
negative effect on a company’s performance and valuation. 
As discussed before, modern corporations worldwide possess high degrees of ownership 
concentration and a strong separation between cash flow rights and control rights. 
However, exactly this composition faces big issues concerning the agency problem, the 
entrenchment effect and the tunnelling effect which I am going to discuss now. 
The agency problem arises because concerns are now related to the divergence of interest 
between large shareholders and minority shareholders. In the UK and USA, ownership was 
atomized across small shareholders  and so, “an individual’s total votes were derived from 
direct investment in a company’s equity” (Gutierrez & Pombo, 2009, p. 117). Due to this, 
the typical agency problem arises because of the lack of direct monitoring between 
managers and shareholders. This situation implies that an enormous internal power and 
discretion is being enjoyed by directives and executives. Therefore, if there would be a 
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direct monitoring that main shareholders use on management, the separation of ownership 
and control, or cash flow and voting rights, would have no effect on a corporation’s 
performance. 
 
The entrenchment effect arises, when firm value at first rises with insider ownership, also 
called the alignment effect, and then declines. The decline of the corporate value is called 
the entrenchment effect.  
In the USA, the average of inside ownership is about 13,9 percent and there is evidence, 
that blockholders do not have an independent effect on the value of a corporation. 
Furthermore, institutional ownership reinforces the advantages and all conjugated positive 
effects of insider ownership on corporate value.  
In East-Asia, “firm value increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest 
shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect” (Cueto, 2008, p. 11). The 
entrenchment effect in this case is, however, when control rights surpass cash flow rights 
for the dominant shareholder. This happens when firm value falls. There is evidence that 
indicates that the value discount is responsible for the separation of ownership and control, 
and not mechanisms such as dual-cross share and cross-holding or even pyramidal 
structures. 
In emerging markets, research on the entrenchment effect was done too. Researchers find 
support for the entrenchment effect and conclude that “the costs of the private benefits of 
control are capitalized into share prices in emerging markets” (Cueto, 2008, p. 11). 
Furthermore, firm value is lower as a result of the cost intensive agency problem. This 
means, that if managers expect lower cash flows, they would tend to increase the 
difference between their voting and cash flow rights. In Chile for example, pyramids are 
often used to separate ownership and control of conglomerates. Furthermore, controllers of 
conglomerates hold more shares than necessary to preserve control. In addition, they find 
that “board members are exclusively within firms associated to their economic groups” 
(Cueto, 2008, p. 12). 
The entrenchment and tunnelling effect are a consequence of low separation effects and 
thus limited. The reasons for the limited separation effects are the minimizing agency 
problems of control delegation and the separation ratios which reinforce the ultimate 
owners to control managers directly. 
 
The results from the separation of ownership and control are presented in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Ownership and control. Source: Gutierrez, L., H., Pombo, C., 2009, p. 118 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
10 BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN EMERGING MARKETS – CASE STUDY 
BRAZIL 
 
 
Brazil wanted to become more competitive with the opening of new markets and the 
privatization of its companies in the 1990s and so, the corporate governance was forced to 
basic changes. Hence, the structure and composition of the board of directors is one of the 
central issues of many scientific studies in the corporate governance.  
 
These days, the Brazilian stock market is one of the largest among the emerging markets 
and even the Brazilian economy has made it to the ten largest in the world, although being 
an emerging market. Furthermore, institutional and foreign investors become more active 
and understood, that partnerships and business agreements were a good strategy to be 
successful. From experience we have learned that “the importance of a governance system 
that promotes healthy and transparent relationships among controlling shareholders, 
managers, outside shareholders, and creditors is now evident” (Leal & De Oliveira, 2002, 
p. 21).  
 
Before focusing on the board of directors in emerging markets in Brazil more detailed, I 
am going to present you some Brazilian market characteristics. We already know that the 
Brazilian market made it to the ten largest in the world, despite an equity market which is 
not liquid and active. More companies prefer going private over going public and those 
companies that decide to go public, cut corners through bond issuance and not stock 
issuance. Additionally, such an important economic factor like trade migrated abroad, 
especially to the USA. 
Furthermore, very high interest rates are responsible for the raising costs of new equity 
capital and dislodging investors from the equity market to the local treasury paper market. 
Unsurprisingly, there several problems with the primary equity market in Brazil that are 
not going to be disposed so easily: (1) The discretionary allocation process favours 
institutional investors and tax avoidance, (2) there is a tax avoidance and lack of 
transparency in the Brazilian credit market, (3) the Brazilian judiciary is inefficient, (4) 
there is a weak investor protection, (5) some legal issues related to corporation law are 
becoming too complex and intricate, (6) there is evidence of minority shareholder 
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expropriation and (7) the different ownership structures result in different agency 
problems. 
 
After this apercu I am going to discuss the structure of board of directors and focus on the 
ownership concentration subsequently. Afterwards, I am going to illustrate the necessity of 
control and board of directors and, thus indicate the need of board independence, 
monitoring and external directors. 
 
10.1 THE STRUCTURE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
At first, I am going to classify the four groups of directors belonging to the board of 
directors with appliance of the model used by Leal and Oliveira (2002, p. 101), whose 
distinguishing criteria followed the model applied by Bhagat and Black (2000): 
“1. director responding the control group: individual who holds a seat either on 
the board or in the management of companies belonging to the control group, or 
who is a member of the family holding the control, or member of the government 
that holds or is part of the control; 
2. “internal” director: professional who takes part both on board and in the 
management of the company at the same time; 
3. “affiliate” director: professional who has one of the following characteristics: 
former employee of the controlling company or group; employee of beneficiary of 
the pension foundation sponsored by the same company; representative elected by 
employees; former member of the government or public company which is part of 
or holds the control; or managing director or director of the controlled company or 
its affiliates; 
4. “other” directors: professionals with no apparent links with the company or its 
controlling shareholders”. 
 
The board composition ratio of 142 Brazilian companies that were surveyed by Leal and 
Oliveira (2000) illustrate that 49 percent of total directors are controlling directors. 10, 20 
and 21 percent of total directors representing the board belong to internal, affiliate and 
other directors, respectively. 
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Furthermore, Brazilian corporate law stipulates a minimum of three members in the board. 
However, the average board size is 6.8 members. 30 out of 142 surveyed Brazilian 
companies have a board of directors with fewer than 5 members; and 18 out of those 30 
have controlling shareholders. 
 
Additionally, the relationship between companies and stockholders is satisfactory and 
conflicts between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders hinder the board 
from acting effective.  
“According to IBGC (1998), 48.7 percent of the companies have their directors chosen by 
shareholders, 17.9 percent by their CEO, and only 2 percent by an independent group” 
(Leal & De Oliveira, 2002, p. 23). Furthermore, shareholders are represented in 51.2 
percent of the boards, suppliers in 14 percent, and institutions in 11.6 percent. However, 
the directors that were selected by shareholders are mostly not allowed to be independent, 
while controlling shareholders control the board of directors. 
In Brazil, the corporate law authorize that the chairman and CEO jobs can be performed by 
the same person. Numerically, about 41 percent of them the CEO is the chairman of the 
board while 72 percent of the companies have the CEO as a member of the board. 
Frequently, the board of directors operate only as advisers. About 81 percent of the 
corporations do not have regulations detailing the role and duties of directors.  
 
10.1.1 Board size 
 
In a company’s corporate governance, the board of directors is an important aspect. 
Considering that, the composition differs in every company, also in an emerging market 
such as Brazil. At least three board members are required by the Brazilian corporate law 
(Law 6404/76, arts. 138 §2, 140). Closely held companies, however, are not required to 
have a board of directors. Both the Brazilian Institute for Corporate Governance (IBGC) 
and the Brazilian securities commission (CVM) recommend 5-9 members in a board. 
Furthermore, the CVM Recommendations on Corporate Governance require companies to 
have at least 5 board members when listed on Bovespa Level 2 or Novo Mercado. In 
practice, however, boards tend to be smaller.  
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Table 1 indicates the breakdown of the size of the board of directors in Brazil. Over two-
thirds of the firms that responded have boards of directors with between 3 and 7 board 
members. Only five Brazilian companies and so 6% have more than 11 directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Size of the Board of Directors: Black, B. S., de Carvalho, A. G., Gorga, E., 2008, 
p. 10 
 
 
10.1.2 Board independence 
 
In many countries companies have to report whether the directors are non-independent or 
independent. Firms can choose between reporting this information publicly or in a way 
their status can be inferred. However, not so in Brazil. It is pretty easy to find out from 
annual reports which board members are also company officers. One way to do so is to 
compare the director’s last names, but it is not a promising method.  
Furthermore, many countries require public companies to have a minimum number of 
independent directors. These requirements are stated through a ‘comply or explain’ code of 
corporate governance. This means that companies can either choose to adopt the 
recommendations or explain why not. An example for the ‘comply or explain’ code of 
corporate governance is the U.K. Combined Code of Corporate Governance. Brazil, 
however, does not have legal requirements for board independence. Furthermore, Brazilian 
corporate law states that only one-third of board members may be company officers, to be 
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specific, Law 6404/76, art. 143, § 1. Black et al. (2008) refer to ‘executive directors’ and 
‘non-executive directors’. Persons who are both directors and officers belong to the first 
category, other directors to the latter category. Black et al. (2008) find that “in many 
Brazilian companies, some or all of the non-executive directors represent the controlling 
family or group” (p. 11). Furthermore, they indicate that firms must have 20% of 
independent directors, when companies want to be listed on Bovespa Level 2 or the Novo 
Mercado. In other words, a board of directors should have either one or two independent 
directors, depending on the board size. 
 
Brazilian companies compared to international standards have few independent directors. 
Over a third of the companies do not have independent directors at all. Another 18% have 
only one independent director. A majority of independent directors in Brazilian companies 
are represented with 10%. However, Black et al. (2008) find that “The tendency for 
Brazilian firms have either no or few independent directors is not limited to smaller firms” 
(p. 12). 
 
 
10.1.3 Representatives of controlling shareholder and minority shareholder 
 
Brazilian companies issue both non-voting preferred shares and voting common shares. 
The majority of the latter are held by a controlling shareholder or group that are 
represented in almost all Brazilian companies. These shareholders and groups choose the 
majority of the board members. Black et al. (2008) state that under legal rule, preferred 
shareholders or minority common shareholders have the right to elect their own 
representative or representatives to the board. 
Among companies with at least one independent director, 42% of firms with preferred 
shares have a representative of the preferred shareholders in the board. Further 42% have a 
representative of the minority common shareholders and another 63% have a 
representative of one or both groups of minority shareholders.  
Among companies with no independent directors, 41% have one or more independent 
directors representing minority shareholders. 
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Now I am going to focus on non-independent directors. There are 3 or more non-
independent directors represented in the majority of Brazilian companies. Due to the legal 
requirement that officers can not exceed one-third of the overall board, most companies 
have only one or two officers or former officers on their board of directors; a few have 
none. In total, only 26% have three or more directors in this category. 
 
Furthermore, Black et al. (2008) determine that “If most directors are not independent, 
[…], and only a minority can be officers, it makes sense that a fair number will be non-
officer representatives of the controlling family or group” (p. 15). So, about 76% of the 
sample of Brazilian companies have at least one such person; 66% have two or more such 
directors and on average there are three such person on the board of directors.  
 
 
10.2 OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
 
One of the main focuses on studies considering corporate governance and the board of 
directors is the identification of causes and consequences of stock ownership 
concentration. One of the basic conclusions deals with the differences in the degree of the 
shareholder’s protection. However, there were discrepancies considering the ownership 
concentration, the market size, liquidity, dividend policies, etc.  
I am going to investigate the ownership concentration in emerging markets, particularly in 
Brazil.  
 
In general, the degree of protection varies to the characteristics of legal frameworks in 
different countries. Hence, the concentration of stock ownership is negatively related to the 
protection of the shareholder’s rights. This means that countries with a better protection, do 
have a better spread of corporate ownership. Furthermore, countries with a legal tradition 
system coming from the French civil legislation, such as Brazil, indicate a higher degree of 
ownership concentration. Additionally, countries with a less efficient protection 
mechanism for shareholders are corporations under family or state control. In these family-
owned and state-owned firms, there is not a significant separation of ownership and 
management.  
 
82 
 
Furthermore, there are different rights that can be derived from stock ownership. These 
rights can be classified into two uniquely defined types. The control rights belong to the 
first type. Control rights imply the possibility of appointing the corporation’s manager. The 
second type, however, is the right to participate in the distribution of dividends. Both rights 
are secured for controlling shareholders in countries with a high shareholding 
concentration only. According to legal requirements, other shareholders do have some 
rights too. They do have the right to dividends and other gains paid by their company. 
These types of rights operate through three mechanisms: “establishing differentiated 
voting rights to several stock classes or types, creating pyramidal shareholding structures, 
and reciprocal participation among companies” (Saito & Dutra, 2006, p. 99). The ‘private 
benefits of control’ is one of the results from these mechanisms, through which the two 
rights are operating. Saito and Dutra (2006) define the ‘private benefits of control’ as 
“benefits appropriated by the controlling shareholder that are not distributed to other 
shareholders” (p. 99). In other words, this is an incentive to less circulation of voting 
rights in countries where minority shareholders enjoy low protection.  
 
Furthermore, there is evidence for the rise of this type of benefits by the controlling 
shareholders. There is evidence that premiums were paid by acquirers of controlling stock. 
Additionally, those premiums were in relation to the market value of shares before sale. It 
is interesting to see that such extra premiums reflect the idea that benefits from control 
stock ownership outweigh the benefits from diversifications of their investment portfolio. 
 
Due to the ownership concentration and the evidence for expropriation, there is a necessity 
of control and the board of directors which I am going to present in the next section after 
presenting you some board actions. 
 
 
10.3 THE NECESSITY OF CONTROL AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
However, what specific actions do board of directors have to accomplish and why is there 
a necessity to control them?  
Black et al. (2008) show that about 23% of board of directors had to replace the CEO. 
Replacing, however, can have two meanings. The first, a dismissal for poor performance 
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and second, a normal replacement when the CEO retires or becomes ill. Similarly, about 
25% of companies had to replace or were asked to replace one or more officers. 
Furthermore, in 8% of the firms the board asked an independent director to resign or did 
not propose re-election of an independent director. At last but not least, no independent 
director had to resign because of a conflict with a policy. Table 2 shows some more actions 
of the board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Actions of the Board: Black, B. S., de Carvalho, A. G., Gorga, E., 2008, p. 21 
 
 
Now I am going to show you why there is a necessity of control and board of directors.  
Monitoring, external directors and board independence are the catchwords to decrease the 
possibility of expropriation by controlling shareholders of company values. It is not that 
easy to monitor the manager’s activities. Mechanisms are required to be implemented “to 
restrain the creation of rules that benefit exclusively controlling shareholders, so shares 
can be priced by the market in an equitable way” (Saitro & Dutra, 2006, p. 100). However, 
Brazil does not depend on external control mechanisms, in which senior managers have to 
deal with the pressure of stock market values and the risk of hostile market acquisitions. In 
Brazil, the only alternative for the internal control is the board of directors. “Board exist in 
all publicly held companies, with deliberative functions, and constituted by professionals 
elected by their own shareholders” (Saitro & Dutra, 2006, p. 100). The role of board of 
directors is to supervise directors, to account books and papers and to activities related to 
the company. 
 
In the USA for example, there is a need of external directors who are independent from 
management and step in with a vast majority, because of disagreements that occur between 
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the shareholders and senior managers. Hence, the majority of executive directors in boards 
would take over the controlling function and settle differences.  
 
In countries such as Brazil, however, conflicts emerge in the relationship between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Therefore, an independent board of 
directors would depend on the controlling shareholders and not on the influence of 
executive directors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
11 CONCLUSION 
  
 
For hundreds of years, research is done on the importance of board of directors across 
boundaries in different organizational forms facing the agency problem that exist between 
company’s owners, its shareholders and management. Nowadays, many areas of corporate 
governance are still unsolved. Scholars and experts, occasionally, investigate the role of 
board of directors and how to improve them to be as efficient as possible while considering 
the shareholders’ profit maximizing orientation. 
 
I have analyzed four groups of directors – the insiders, outsiders, institutional portfolio 
holders and independent directors. However, the board composition and board size differs 
from country and corporate governance system and do affect performance whether the 
corporation is estimating an equilibrium or non-equilibrium situation. Unfortunately, 
insufficient findings on this topic circulate among a large number of scientific studies and 
so, more research has to be done to consider the board’s efficiency very carefully. 
 
In the late 1990s, board reforms started to flourish because of scandals of well-known 
corporations and takeover-activities. The increasing competition, the firm performance and 
the shareholder protection as well as many other factors called for changes. However, 
studies provide evidence of the inefficiency of board reforms considering the board’s 
multiple functions such as strategy setting, management monitoring, crisis management 
and regulatory compliance. Furthermore, reforms make mistakes such as short-term 
rebuilding confidence of investors or calming down shareholders’ anger to next elections. 
So, reforms are rumoured to have one-size-fits-all consequences that tend to trace instead 
of causing changes in boards and are caused due to market forces and regulations. The 
consequences of board reforms are obvious: (1) new rules were implemented in large listed 
industrialized jurisdictions, but also in small and non-listed companies in emerging 
markets with the consequence of being an inflexible ‘costly one-size-fits-all product’, (2) 
too detailed regulatory implications result in trade-offs and (3) interest groups started to 
avoid reforms that would significantly endanger their private benefits.  
Furthermore, reformers have to consider the corporate governance system when trying to 
improve corporate governance issues. The strong international competition among 
corporations originating from the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ corporate governance systems lead to 
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reformers wanting companies to adopt parts of the ‘Anglo-Saxon-system’ that, however, is 
not converging to all corporate governance systems at all. It is worth to mention that the 
‘Anglo-Saxon-system’ has the best shareholder protection compared to other systems. 
Again, scholars and experts do not know if there is a corporate governance system that will 
be flexible enough to converge easily. However, if world-wide competition increases, 
companies and organizations will result in implementing the ‘best-practice’ corporate 
governance, which is the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ system. 
 
About thirty countries are in transition to higher levels of economic development and 
hence, adopted the name of “emerging markets”. The emerging markets gained the 
investor’s interest, though indicating a high market risk and volatility as well as the lack of 
financial products and services available to foreign investors.  
Latin America do exhibit interesting corporate governance systems and a high ownership 
and control concentration, especially in Brazil and so, is my choice of representing 
emerging markets.  
To be able to understand the consequences that a separation of ownership and control are 
facing, I had to measure the importance of the ownership and control structure by 
comparing voting rights with cash flow rights. The latter represent the ownership structure 
which influences the efficiency of the market for corporate control directly, while voting 
rights represent the control structure which investigate to whom the company finally 
belongs. There is strong evidence that corporate control is privately owned because of the 
low cash flow rights to voting rights ratios and the slightly decreasing separation. Though 
the separation is being encouraged because of shareholder protection and so on, the result 
is remarkable. Evidence indicates that the separation between the ownership and control 
structure has a negative effect on a company’s performance as well as valuation and 
engender the agency problem, entrenchment and tunnelling effect, additionally.  
 
Another important aspect are the effects of the most prevalent Latin American ownership 
structures on firm performance, in particular family structures and business groups.  
Evidence shows that family-controlled firms do have a better performance than non-family 
controlled firms. Furthermore, if family-controlled companies would improve their 
governance bodies, management skills and start to care about market control, they will 
overcome the majority of their traditional weaknesses and take advantage of their strengths 
to succeed. 
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The effect of business groups on performance depend on the corporate governance and the 
firm consolidation and the relationship between ownership concentration - economic and 
voting rights - and social ties - interlocking directors and family ties.  
 
The emerging markets have enough sources to research on board of directors. Leal and 
Oliveira (2002) find four groups of directors belonging to the board of directors: (1) 
director responding the control group, (2) internal directors, (3) affiliate directors and (4) 
other directors. In their study of 142 Brazilian companies, 49 percent of total directors are 
controlling directors. 10, 20 and 21 percent of total directors representing the board belong 
to internal, affiliate and other directors, respectively. Furthermore, Brazilian corporate law 
stipulates a minimum of three members in the board. However, the average board size is 
6.8 members. 30 out of 142 surveyed Brazilian companies have a board of directors with 
fewer than 5 members; and 18 out of those 30 have controlling shareholders. These results 
indicate that because of the ownership concentration showed above, there is evidence for 
expropriation and a necessity of control and the board of directors. 
At last but not least, there are possibilities to reduce the expropriation by controlling 
shareholders of company values. These possibilities are reinforcing the monitoring 
function, implementing external directors and reinforcing board independence. 
 
In the end, my diploma thesis has shown that there is still more research to be done on 
every aspect considering board of directors, particularly in emerging markets. This is a 
rather new topic, so we have to watch how corporate governance will develop and how 
board reforms will affect the board of directors as to new developments. Scholars and 
experts differ in opinion. This may be a reason that they focus on different aspects and aim 
at different results considering board of directors, their tasks and it’s development. They 
have to realize that when in Rome, do as the Romans do - it is impossible to standardize 
corporate governance systems worldwide. The only possibility is to adapt parts of different 
systems that can be implemented, otherwise the whole system will break down. 
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V.  APPENDIX 
 
(1)  Abstract 
 
Das Interesse an Corporate Governance, im Speziellen der Aufsichtsräte, stieg im Laufe 
der letzten Jahrzehnte rasant an. Im Mittelpunkt vieler Diskussionen steht eine 
zielgerichtete und verantwortungsvolle Unternehmensführung, die aufgrund von 
steigenden Unternehmensübernahmen angestrebt und gefordert wird. Einige Gründe für 
das ankämpfen des Privatsektors gegen Misstrauen und Zweifel sind milliardenhohe 
Defizite amerikanischer Investmentbanken in den Jahren 2007 und 2008, Bilanzskandale 
in internationalen Unternehmen sowie die Präsenz von überdurchschnittlichen 
Managementgehältern. Aufgrund dessen werden besonders in börsennotierten 
Unternehmen immer höhere Anforderungen an transparente Unternehmensaktivitäten 
gestellt. Weiters wird ein Hauptaugenmerk auf die Bewahrung von Aktionärsinteressen 
gelegt. Vor allem in Schwellenländern wie jene in Latein Amerika, in denen die 
Rechtssysteme tendenziell unterentwickelt und der Aktionärsschutz schwach sind, ist der 
Bedarf einer erfolgreichen Corporate Governance hoch. Studien indizieren, dass eine durch 
Aufsichtsräte erfolgreich gelenkte Corporate Governance zu Wirtschaftswachstum und 
Stabilität am Finanzmarkt führen. 
 
Trotz des hohen Marktrisikos, dem Mangel an Finanzprodukten und unzureichenden 
Informationen für ausländische Investoren, gewinnen die Schwellenländer immer mehr an 
Interesse. Im Rahmen meiner Diplomarbeit behandle ich die theoretischen Ansätze der 
Aufsichtsräte und analysiere anschließend deren Entwicklung in Brasilien. Brasilien ist ein 
Beweis dafür, dass auch in einem Schwellenland mit einem schwachen Rechtssystem, ein 
hoher Aktionärsschutz und hohe Transparenzauflagen aufrechterhalten werden können, die 
dem internationalen Wettbewerb durchaus standhalten. 
 
49 Prozent aller Direktoren gehören den Controlling Shareholdern an. 10, 20 und 21 
Prozent aller repräsentierenden Aufsichtsräte, gehören jeweils den internen, externen und 
anderen Direktoren an. Überdies setzt das brasilianische Unternehmensgesetz vor, dass 
mindestens drei Mitglieder dem Aufsichtsrat angehören. Die durchschnittliche Größe des 
Aufsichtsrates besteht aus 6.8 Mitgliedern. 30 von insgesamt 142 begutachteten 
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brasilianischen Unternehmen weisen eine Anzahl von weniger als 5 
Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern auf, und 18 aus den 142 haben Controlling Shareholders. Diese 
Resultate veranschaulichen das Problem der Zwangenteignung und beweisen, dass 
Aufsichtsräte und Kontrollfunktionen im brasilianischen Markt von Nöten sind.  
 
Entwicklungen der Unternehmenspolitik müssen beobachten werden, um zu erforschen, 
inwieweit Reformen die neuen Entwicklungen der Aufsichtsräte beeinflussen. Zuerst 
jedoch müssten Experten realisieren, dass die Unternehmenspolitik den örtlichen 
Gepflogenheiten angepasst werden muss, da eine weltweite Standardisierung der 
Unternehmenspolitik zu keiner Lösung führt und das ganze System mit einem 
Zusammenbruch droht. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xix 
 
(2)  Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Name                           Robert Rychlewski 
                                    Geboren am                 18.04.1985, in Wien 
                                    Staatsbürgerschaft      Österreich 
                                    Kontakt                        robertrychlewski@gmail.com 
 
 
 
Ausbildung 
 
10/2004 – 02/2010      Studium der Internationalen Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Universität Wien 
                                    Schwerpunkte: Internationales Management,  
                                                             Energie- und Umweltmanagement 
 
09/2003 – 05/2004      Grundwehrdienst bei der 1.Gardekompanie, Wien 
                                    Ausbildung: Wachsoldat, Wachkommandant 
 
09/1999 – 06/2003      GRG 21, Franklinstrasse 21, A-1210 Wien 
 
09/1995 – 06/1999      Erich Fried-Realgymnasium, Glasergasse 9, A-1090 Wien 
 
 
 
 
xx 
 
Berufserfahrung 
 
07/2009 – 09/2009      Concordia Language Villages, Concordia College, Moorhead, MN, USA 
                                    Personalberater, Geschäftsführer                                                
 
07/2008 – 08/2008      Industrie- und Handelskammer des Saratower Gebietes, Russland 
                                    Praktika in den Bereichen International Cooperation und Business Support                                               
 
07/2008 – 08/2008      Robert Bosch AG, Saratow, Russland 
                                    Umweltschutzingenieur 
 
07/2007 – 09/2007      Concordia Language Villages, Concordia College, Moorhead, MN, USA 
                                    Geschäftsführer                                                
 
07/2006 – 09/2006      Concordia Language Villages, Concordia College, Moorhead, MN, USA 
                                    Geschäftsführer          
                                       
07/2005 – 09/2005      Concordia Language Villages, Concordia College, Moorhead, MN, USA 
                                    Assistent des Geschäftsführers         
       
07/2004 – 09/2004      Concordia Language Villages, Concordia College, Moorhead, MN, USA 
                                    Sprachlehrer   
 
07/2003 – 09/2003      Concordia Language Villages, Concordia College, Moorhead, MN, USA 
                                    Sprachlehrer            
 
Fremdsprachen und sonstige Kenntnisse 
 
»  Polnisch               Muttersprache 
»  Englisch               verhandlungssicher 
»  Russisch               fließend 
»  Französisch          Grundkenntnisse 
»  Spanisch               Grundkenntnisse 
 
»  Führerschein der Klassen A und B 
»  Retterschein des ASBÖ-LV WIEN 
